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Impact of Carbon Price Policies on U.S. Industry 
Mun S. Ho, Richard Morgenstern, and Jhih-Shyang Shih 
Abstract 
This paper informs the discussion of carbon price policies by examining the potential for adverse 
impacts on domestic industries, with a focus on detailed sector-level analysis. The assumed policy 
scenario involves a unilateral economy-wide $10/ton CO2 charge without accompanying border tax 
adjustments or other complementary policies. Four modeling approaches are developed as a proxy for the 
different time horizons over which firms can pass through added costs, change input mix, adopt new 
technologies, and reallocate capital. Overall, we find that a readily identifiable set of industries experience 
particularly adverse impacts as measured by reduced output and that the relative burdens on different 
industries are remarkably consistent across the four time horizons. Output rebounds considerably over 
longer time horizons, and the adverse impacts on profits diminish even more rapidly in most cases. Over 
the short term employment losses mirror output declines, while gains in other industries fully offset the 
losses over the longer horizons. At the same time, leakage abroad is considerable in some sectors, 
particularly when reductions in exports are considered. 
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Impact of Carbon Price Policies on U.S. Industry 
Mun S. Ho, Richard Morgenstern, and Jhih-Shyang Shih* 
Executive Summary 
As the United States moves toward mandatory action on climate change, an important 
consideration is the potential for new policies to cause significant declines in some domestic 
industries, with corresponding increases in imports and production elsewhere in the world. This 
is especially the case if the policy is unilateral, without a corresponding effort from U.S. trading 
partners. 
This possibility gives rise to two serious concerns:  
•  potential damage to the domestic economy, especially to the subset of industries 
that may be vulnerable to unilateral, or near unilateral, carbon mitigation policies; 
and   
•  erosion of a domestic policy’s environmental benefits if an increase in domestic 
production costs causes manufacturing to shift to nations that have weaker 
greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation policies or none at all.  
The effects of a unilateral policy placing a price on carbon dioxide (CO2) will vary 
greatly across domestic industries. The industry-level impacts are fundamentally tied to the 
energy (more specifically, the carbon) intensity of those industries and the degree to which they 
can pass costs on to consumers of their products (often other industries). The strength of 
competition from imports and consumers’ ability to substitute other, less carbon-intensive 
alternatives for a given product play crucial roles in determining the ultimate impacts on 
domestic production and employment.
                                                 
* Mun S. Ho, Richard Morgenstern, and Jhih-Shyang Shih are visiting scholar, senior fellow, and fellow, 
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The potential economic consequences for U.S. industry are unprecedented in the history 
of environmental regulation due to the scale of activity affected by a unilateral, economywide 
CO2 pricing policy. It would not only have significant direct impacts on coal, and other domestic 
energy industries, it could adversely affect the competitiveness of a number of large energy-
intensive, import-sensitive manufacturing industries. Unfortunately, information concerning 
specific industry-level impacts associated with new carbon mitigation policies is quite limited.  
The most common approach to assessing the impact of carbon-control policies is to focus 
on the long-run impacts, after firms have adjusted by using new energy-efficient technologies 
and new import patterns have been established. Such analysis, however, fails to capture an 
important part of the story—the short-run costs that most firms will experience. A chemical or 
steel plant suddenly faced with higher energy costs cannot immediately or costlessly convert to 
more energy-efficient methods.  
From a policy perspective, the path taken to the long-run outcome is extremely important. 
A carbon control policy that ignores these short- and medium-term impacts will raise concerns 
about fairness and will likely be opposed by many stakeholders. Further, the appropriate policy 
response can change over time; a policy that addresses fairness questions in the initial years may 
not be appropriate in the future.  
We recently examined how a unilateral, economywide CO2 pricing policy would affect a 
large set of industries, taking into account the ways that adjustment costs may change over time. 
To paint a full picture, we employed four different modeling approaches using consistent 
assumptions in order to consider outcomes along four different time scales: 
1.  The very short run, where firms cannot adjust prices and profits fall accordingly.  
2.  The short run where firms can raise prices to reflect the higher energy costs, with 
a corresponding decline in sales as a result of product or import substitution.   
3.  The medium run, when in addition to the changes in output prices, the mix of 
inputs may also change, but capital remains in place, and economywide effects 
are considered. 
4.  The long run, when capital may be reallocated and replaced with more energy 
efficient technologies.   
Impacts were measured in terms of costs, profits, employment, and trade effects, 
assuming a unilateral $10/ton CO2 price without any offsetting measures regarding permit 




After examining these different time horizons and impacts, our results yield a number of 
observations. (For more details, see tables at end of full paper.) 
•  Measured by the reduction in domestic output, a readily identifiable set of 
industries is at greatest risk of contraction over both the short and long 
terms.  Within the manufacturing sector, at a relatively aggregated, two- or three-
digit standard industrial classification level, the hardest hit industries are: 
petroleum refining, chemicals and plastics, primary metals, and nonmetallic 
minerals. 
•  Although the short-run output reductions are relatively large in these 
industries, they shrink over time as firms adjust inputs and adopt new 
technologies. The industries that continue to bear the impacts are generally the 
same ones affected initially, albeit at reduced levels. When measured in terms of 
reduced profits, the rebound is especially large and, for some industries, virtually 
complete. 
•  Focusing on the nearer-term timeframes, where certain simplifying 
assumptions enable us to conduct a more disaggregated analysis, we observe 
that the largest cost increases are concentrated in particular segments of 
these industries. Using a broad definition of costs that includes capital inputs, 
petrochemical manufacturing and cement see very short-run cost increases of 
more than four percent from a modest charge of $10 per ton of CO2, while iron 
and steel mills, aluminum, and lime products see cost increases exceeding two 
percent. 
•  In the nonmanufacturing sector, we see that although the overall size of the 
production losses also declines over time, a more diverse pattern applies.  
Specifically, the impact on electric utilities does not substantially worsen over 
time (compared to other industries such as mining, which experiences a 
continuing erosion of sales) as broader adjustments occur throughout the 
economy.  Agriculture faces modest but persistent output declines over time, 
while the service sector is largely unscathed across all timeframes. 
•  In terms of employment, short-term job losses are modeled as proportional 
to those of output. Over the longer term, however, when labor markets are able Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
 
  iv
to adjust, the remaining, relatively small, losses are fully offset by gains in other 
industries.   
•  Overall, the leakage rate (that is, the rate at which reductions in U.S. 
emissions is offset by increases in foreign emissions) is estimated to be about 
25 percent. For the three most energy-intensive sectors, chemicals, nonmetallic 
mineral products, and primary metals, the leakage due to imports and exports is 
more than 40 percent. 
Policymakers have a number of tools at their disposal to address the competitiveness 
challenges that are likely to accompany a carbon-pricing policy. These options include: weaker 
overall program targets, partial or full exemption from the carbon policy, standards instead of 
market-based policies for some sectors, free allowance under a cap-and-trade system, and trade-
related policies, including some form of border adjustment for energy- or carbon-intensive 
goods. 
For a more in-depth discussion of policy options, see “Addressing Competitiveness Concerns in 
the Context of a Mandatory Policy for Reducing U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions,” by Richard 
Morgenstern. Issue Brief # 8 in Assessing U.S. Climate Policy Options, Raymond J. Kopp and 
William A. Pizer, editors. RFF Report, Nov. 2007. 
www.rff.org/Publications/Pages/CPF_AssessingUSClimatePolicyOptions_IB8.aspx 
Modeling Results 
Short-Run Output Effects 
In the short run, producers raise prices to cover the higher unit costs when a price is 
placed on carbon. Unlike a very-short term effect, which does not allow for behavioral responses 
by firms or individuals, here customers are able to switch to alternative goods and/or imports, 
leading to a fall in sales and output. The output decline varies among industries, but it can be 
significant for energy intensive industries like petrochemical manufacturing and fossil fuel 
suppliers (see Table 4 at end of full paper). 
 
Medium and Long Term Output Effects 
Over the medium term, firms can adjust their input mix to adapt to higher energy prices, 
thus reducing their vulnerability to the new tax. At the same time, however, consumers are Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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adjusting their purchases to avoid the higher prices for carbon-intensive products and thus 
reducing their demands. The cost-reducing effect of input substitution is generally dominant (see 
Table 6 at end of full paper). Over time, for all but two manufacturing industries (petroleum 
refining and fabricated metals), the cost shock of the carbon tax is reduced, and smaller price 
increases are needed to cover the higher costs of carbon-intensive inputs. 
A further metric of importance is the impact on employment.  As is the case with output, 
only for petroleum refining and fabricated metals is the reduction in employment larger in the 
medium- and long-term horizons compared to the short-run, no-substitution case. Going from the 
medium to the long run where firms can switch capital, the reduction in employment diminishes 
in all cases. In two extreme manufacturing cases, apparel and electrical machinery, the medium-
run employment reductions turn to gains in the long run. That is, the ability to substitute capital 
for the more expensive carbon-intensive inputs in the long run leads to bigger reductions in 
energy consumption and smaller reductions in labor use.  
In the nonmanufacturing industries, we also see a smaller employment impact in the 
medium run compared to the short run except for two industries, the most interesting being 
electric utilities, where output falls by 1.4 percent but employment rises by 8 percent in the 
medium run. Going from the medium to long run, the three fossil-fuel mining industries actually 
see greater employment losses. That is, users of fuels substitute capital for fuel over the longer 
term and the demand for coal, oil, and gas falls, leading to lower employment.  
Capital use in the long run is driven by two opposing effects. On one hand, outputs from 
carbon-intensive sectors are diminished, reducing the demand for capital. On the other, there is 
substitution from expensive energy to cheaper capital, which increases the demand for capital in 
these sectors. The net effect is negative for all but three manufacturing industries. That is, the 
reduction in capital demand due to the reduction in output dominates the substitution of capital 
for energy in most industries. The capital that moves out of the declining carbon-intensive 
sectors goes to services and, perhaps surprisingly, to the electricity sector. For manufacturing 
industries, only in the food, apparel, and electrical machinery industries are the long-run 
demands for capital slightly higher after a carbon tax is in place.  
Trade Impacts 
The trade impacts are displayed in Table 8 (at end of full paper). National domestic 
consumption is the sum of consumption by firms, households, and government and is equal to 
domestic output plus imports less exports. The second column gives the changes in consumption Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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due to a $10/ton CO2 tax, while the last three columns present the contributions of the changes in 
terms of output, imports, and exports. We can see a consistent pattern among carbon-intensive 
manufacturing industries: a modest increase in imports and a bigger reduction in exports. 
Overall, the emissions increase in the rest of the world is 26 percent of the reduction in U.S. 
emissions as a result of a unilateral U.S. carbon tax. This is a relatively high leakage rate but 
consistent with other studies. Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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Impact of Carbon Price Policies on U.S. Industry 
Mun S. Ho, Richard Morgenstern, and Jhih-Shyang Shih 
I. Introduction 
As the United States moves toward mandatory action on climate change an important 
consideration is the potential for new policies to cause significant declines in some domestic 
industries, along with corresponding increases in production elsewhere in the world. The 
possibility of such impacts gives rise to at least two major concerns. The first concern involves 
the risk of damage to the domestic economy, especially to the subset of carbon-intensive 
industries that is particularly vulnerable to domestic carbon pricing policies. Unilateral or near-
unilateral policies would exacerbate this risk. The second concern relates directly to the potential 
for emissions leakage, i.e., increases in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the rest of the world 
in response to the domestic policy. Since climate change is driven by global emissions, the 
environmental benefits of a domestic policy could be substantially eroded if an increase in 
domestic production costs caused the manufacture of emissions-intensive goods to shift to 
nations that have weaker GHG mitigation policies, or none at all.  
The impact of a CO2 price on domestic industries is fundamentally tied to the energy 
(more specifically, the carbon) intensity of those industries, and the degree to which they can 
pass costs on to consumers of their products (often other industries). The effect of these 
characteristics on domestic production hinges on the extent to which domestically produced 
goods face competition from abroad and consumers’ ability to substitute less carbon-intensive 
alternatives for a given product.  
 The scale of the potential impacts of a unilateral, economywide CO2 pricing policy is 
unprecedented in the history of environmental regulation, as is the range of industries that would 
be affected. By contrast, the debate leading up to the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments was 
informed by extensive analyses of the likely effects of a cap-and-trade program for sulfur dioxide 
emissions on a single sector, the electric power industry. These analyses were greatly simplified 
by the fact that the policy under consideration targeted a regulated industry that faced almost no 
international competition. A pricing policy for CO2 emissions would not only have more 
significant direct impacts on coal and other domestic energy industries, it could also cause 
adverse business impacts on energy-intensive, import-sensitive manufacturing industries. Since 
comprehensive information concerning industry-level impacts associated with new carbon 
mitigation policies is quite limited, debate is often dominated by anecdotal information.  Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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A common methodology for assessing the impact of carbon control policies is to estimate 
the long-run cost to consumer welfare after firms have adjusted by using new kinds of energy-
efficient technologies and after new import patterns have been established. In many of these 
analyses, a mobile factor framework is used in which workers and capital owners do not suffer 
much (as producers) since they are assumed to be able to shift from the taxed sectors to the 
untaxed sectors. Such long-run analysis, however, fails to capture the short-run costs that most 
firms will experience. A chemical plant suddenly faced with higher energy costs cannot 
immediately and without cost convert to more energy-efficient methods. If it leaves its output 
price unchanged, the higher input costs will lower profits. If it tries to raise prices to cover the 
higher costs, it will be faced with lower sales. A carbon control policy that does not address these 
impacts in a fair manner will likely be opposed by many stakeholders. Further, what’s fair can 
change over time: a policy deemed to be fair for the initial years may become unfair in the 
future.  
This paper advances the analysis of competitiveness issues by providing relatively 
transparent analyses of the impacts of a unilateral, economywide $10/ton CO2 pricing policy on a 
disaggregated set of industrial sectors, taking account of time-relevant changes in adjustment 
costs. The analysis does not consider the use of gratis allowance allocation, trade-related 
measures, or other complementary policies designed to reduce the competitiveness impacts. Four 
time horizons are considered: 
• The very short run, where output prices cannot be changed and profits fall accordingly;  
• The short run, where output prices can rise to reflect the higher energy costs, with a 
corresponding decline in sales as a result of product and/or import substitution;   
• The medium run, when in addition to the changes in output prices, the mix of inputs 
may also change, but capital remains in place, and economywide (“general equilibrium”) effects 
are considered; and 
• The long run, or full general equilibrium analysis, when capital may be reallocated and 
replaced with more energy efficient technologies.  
 
Both the first and second time horizons are analyzed in a partial equilibrium framework 
with fixed input coefficients. The first one, with no changes in output prices, involves no demand 
adjustments whatsoever. The second time horizon requires an estimate of the demand elasticities 
for each industry’s output, that is, how much sales fall when output prices are raised. These Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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elasticities are estimated by simulating an economywide model under constrained conditions. 
Such a calculation allows us to capture the effect of customers switching to other products when 
output prices are raised, including the switch to imported varieties of the same product.  
The third time horizon is analyzed by direct application of a relatively simple long-run 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. The use of such a model allows us to take into 
account the fact that the demand for steel depends not only on the price of steel but also on the 
price of plastics, indeed the price of everything in the economy. Higher energy prices raise the 
prices of steel and plastic and directly lower the demand for both. In addition, the lower demand 
for plastic indirectly lowers the chemical industry’s demand for steel. These general equilibrium 
effects are not considered in the first two time horizons. At the same time, this third case 
continues to assume that capital is not mobile but stuck in a given industry. Therefore, when 
sales fall due to higher costs being passed on as higher prices, profits will also fall, leading to a 
lower rate of return to capital. 
 The fourth time horizon, the full long-run analysis, allows for capital mobility. There are 
no industry-specific profit effects, but simply the change in the economywide return to labor 
versus capital. The focus is on the long-run effects of GHG policies on consumption patterns, 
that is, households and other components of final demand switching to less energy-intensive 
products. This switch in final demand changes the structure of production and total energy 
consumption, but the long-run framework implies that returns to capital are equalized across 
industries. We should note that the “long run” may be defined in a variety of ways. Our 
definition is the simplest concept using a one-period model where the supply of capital is given 
exogenously. A model with intertemporal features that determines savings endogenously will 
identify an effect not considered here—that is, how the total stock of capital responds to the 
changes in prices due to a carbon tax. 
For all four time horizons analyzed, we use a relatively disaggregated modeling 
framework, based on the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) basis. For the 
two longer-run scenarios we use the two-digit level which allows for 21 sectors across the U.S. 
economy, including 13 manufacturing industries. For the first two modeling frameworks 
sufficient data are available to subdivide a number of the categories into finer three-digit 
groupings, a total of 52 industrial sectors. Estimates of carbon intensity are made for the year 
2002, the most recent year of the benchmark input–output (IO) table, using industry-specific 
information on output, intermediate input, fossil fuel use, and emissions for that year. Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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The focus is on a sequence of transparent steps that allows readers to understand the 
analysis in a way not conveyed by the typical black box of aggregate or very long-term economic 
modeling. We estimate the impacts measured in terms of reduced output, profits, employment, 
and trade effects. Arguably, such analysis is critical to both informing the debate on 
competitiveness and providing guidance regarding how those concerns might be addressed, 
recognizing that the nature and magnitude of any new policy may depend critically on the time 
horizon considered. Even the ranking of industries by cost impacts should be useful for the 
policy challenge of assessing the need for, and nature of, any special considerations that might 
accompany a broad-based carbon-pricing mechanism.  
The next section reviews a number of previous studies that have examined 
competitiveness issues at a detailed, industry-specific level. Section III describes the basic 
methodology used in our modeling work. Section IV describes the data sources along with the 
key data gaps at this level of disaggregation. A more detailed description of the data is presented 
in Appendix A. Section V presents the principal results, and Section VI compares the results 
across multiple time horizons along several different dimensions. Section VII provides cross-
model comparisons, and Section VIII offers some overall conclusions.  
II. Other Studies on Detailed Industry Impacts 
The literature on industry impacts of carbon policies has grown considerably over the last 
several years, including both policy-oriented and more technical studies.2 The technical studies 
build on the extensive work on the effect of environmental regulation of conventional (non-
GHG) pollutants on the competitiveness of the U.S. manufacturing sector.  For example, a recent 
paper by Levinson and Taylor (2008) examines in detail the effect of the 60 percent decline in 
conventional pollution from U.S. manufacturing during the period 1970–2002 concurrent with 
the 80 percent increase in real output during that period. Overall, the authors conclude that 
technological progress accounts for well over half of the observed pollution reductions and that 
the relocation of polluting activities overseas plays a relatively minor role. At the same time, 
                                                 
2 A recent volume by Houser et al. (2008) assesses the economics and trade flows of key carbon-intensive industries 
and summarizes a range of policy options under discussion in the U.S. Congress both in terms of their effectiveness 
in reducing emissions and addressing competitiveness issues. Overall, they argue that the impacts are relatively 
modest; those impacts that do exist are concentrated in a small number of industries, including steel, copper, 
aluminum, cement, glass, paper, and basic chemicals. 
 Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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they find that the role of technology seems to be shrinking, making changes in the composition 
of U.S. manufacturing relatively more important for the future. Other research, based on the 
variation in environmental stringency across individual U.S. states, has found larger impacts 
(Greenstone 2002). 
Whether or not U.S. firms will react to the imposition of a carbon price in the same way 
they have to the regulation of conventional pollution is very much an open question. Arguably, 
the cost of complying with carbon regulations might be higher than for conventional pollution 
because of the very limited applicability of end of pipe solutions such as sequestration. Thus, 
industries which cannot readily switch fuels or alter their production processes may face 
significantly higher costs. Since there is no actual experience with carbon prices in the United 
States, the assessment of impacts is generally based on modeling analyses—themselves derived 
from historical economic relationships—rather than on direct empirical observation of changes 
in industrial activity associated with the imposition of carbon or energy prices. The principal 
exception we are aware of is recent econometric work by Aldy and Pizer (2008) involving a 
cross-section time-series analysis of the competitiveness impacts associated with U.S. electricity 
prices over a 20-year period.3  They estimate industry-specific price elasticities and calculate the 
likely competitiveness impacts of a unilateral U.S. carbon price of $15/ton of CO2. The Aldy 
Pizer results are roughly comparable to our short and medium term cases. The remainder of this 
section reviews recent modeling analyses of carbon price impacts focusing on the four different 
time horizons considered. 
Very Short–Run Time Horizon 
Using IO data from four-digit U.S. manufacturing industries, Morgenstern et al. (2004) 
developed a simple linear model to assess the very short–run impacts on domestic manufacturing 
of carbon price policies. Their model, which assumes that output prices cannot be changed, is 
based on combustion emissions from all sources, including those associated with the purchase of 
electricity and other domestically produced intermediate inputs. Process emissions associated 
with cement production and other industrial processes are not included. Also ignored are changes 
in sales and output due to firms passing on the higher carbon costs, and general equilibrium 
                                                 
3 Their initial results suggest that the losses in output and employment may be somewhat higher than those reported 
here, although some of the differences are clearly related to their use of narrower industrial categories. Not 
surprisingly, the narrowness of the industry categories is a key issue throughout the literature: broad categories show 
smaller effects; narrow categories show larger effects.  Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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effects such as higher natural gas prices due to fuel switching from coal, the latter creating 
additional competitiveness concerns for industries that use natural gas. Overall, Morgenstern et 
al. (2004) find a diverse pattern of impacts across the 361 individual manufacturing industries 
examined, with only a few of them bearing disproportionately large burdens. They also find quite 
different impacts for an economywide versus an electricity-only carbon price policy.  
A recent paper by Hourcade et al. (2007) developed a screening model to examine 
competitiveness impacts on the United Kingdom manufacturing sector of phase III of the 
European Union Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS). Like the earlier U.S. analyses, Hourcade 
et al. assume that firms are unable to adjust output prices in response to higher carbon costs. 
Unlike the U.S. papers, however, they include process emissions in the cement and other relevant 
industries but exclude purchase of intermediate inputs other than electricity. Their analysis 
develops industry-specific information on international trade flows but does not explicitly model 
the output or profitability of individual industries. Like the U.S. studies, Hourcade et al. find a 
large divergence of impacts across the individual manufacturing industries.  
Short-Run Time Horizon  
On the basis of detailed case studies, two recent papers estimate the competitiveness 
effects of the early phases of the EU-ETS: one by McKinsey & Company and Ecofys (2006; 
hereafter, McKinsey) for the European Commission, and the second by Reinaud (2005) for the 
International Energy Agency (IEA). These studies focus on representative subsectors within 
particular energy-intensive manufacturing industries and explicitly consider the extent to which 
free permit allocation under the EU-ETS (based on direct emissions only) could mitigate 
estimated cost impacts.4 Both studies start with a calculation of the cost increases that would 
arise from a particular CO2 charge, including emissions-related cost increases from the 
combustion of fossil energy and from process emissions, as well as the indirect costs of higher 
                                                 
4 While a free allocation clearly benefits shareholders, the question of whether a free allocation based on historic 
emissions would offset the production cost increases that are relevant for competitiveness concerns (in terms of 
changing prices, production, and employment) remains open. Rules that rescind allocations if a plant closes would 
encourage facilities to use free allowances to offset costs; rules that allow facility owners to keep free allowances 
when a plant closes would not.  Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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electricity prices.5 The indirect costs reflected in intermediate inputs other than electricity are 
excluded, as are the general equilibrium effects from higher natural gas prices.  
The McKinsey study makes explicit assumptions about how much of any production cost 
increase associated with a carbon price will pass through to higher product prices in different 
manufacturing industries. McKinsey bases these assumptions on the published literature and its 
own industry expertise. However, McKinsey only goes so far as to calculate net cost impacts: 
effects on output are not reported. Estimated price impacts are based on the threshold change in 
revenue needed to keep a facility open, assuming no change in demand for the product (or 
facility output) in response to higher prices. Importantly, the analysis also assumes that firms will 
attempt to pass through all cost increases associated with the climate policy, regardless of any 
free allocation. In contrast, the Reinaud analysis calculates the net effect on prices and then 
applies demand elasticities drawn from the literature to estimate changes in output. That is, 
McKinsey focuses on changes in net costs while the Reinaud study attempts to explicitly trace 
cost impacts through to effects on output. Thus, Reinaud’s approach most closely resembles 
what we label the short-term horizon. 
The results from both European studies suggest that initial cost impacts, before 
adjustment for free allowance allocation or cost pass-through, are substantial in some cases and 
vary widely across industry subsectors. This variation reflects differences in energy intensity 
and, particularly in the case of cement, differences in process emissions. Both studies estimate 
the largest initial cost impacts in basic oxygen furnace (BOF) steel, aluminum, and cement, with 
relatively smaller impacts in electric arc furnace (EAF) steel.     
Assuming that freely allocated allowances are incorporated directly into the firms’ 
production cost accounting, net cost burdens fall significantly if industries are given a free 
allocation of allowances equivalent to 95 percent of their direct emissions. According to 
McKinsey, the net cost burden after free allocation for BOF steel and cement, for example, falls 
by 85–90 percent, an amount that reflects the substantial primary fuel consumption and only 
modest use of electricity that characterizes these industries. In contrast, electricity-intensive 
                                                 
5 Both studies assume the power generation industry passes on the full opportunity cost of carbon allowances. To 
calculate costs associated with electricity consumption, the McKinsey study assumes 0.41 tons of CO2 emissions per 
megawatt-hour; the Reinaud study uses the 2001 average CO2 intensity of grid-supplied electricity. Neither study 
considers how facilities might respond to a carbon price by reducing direct emissions and/or electricity 
consumption, thereby lessening the cost impacts of the carbon policy. Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
 
  8
industries with significant indirect emissions from electricity use, like EAF steel, see a smaller 
decline (roughly 10 percent) in the net cost burden under a 95 percent free allocation based only 
on direct emissions.6   
Medium- and Long-Run Analyses Based on CGE Analyses 
Unlike the partial equilibrium analyses covering the very short and the short run horizons, 
the medium and long run analyses rely on computable general equilibrium (CGE) models of the 
entire economy.  At the same time, most of the CGE models are quite aggregate in nature, 
generally containing five or fewer nonenergy sectors (Fischer and Morgenstern 2006). We are 
aware of only two such models used for carbon policy analysis that include extensive industry 
detail: the domestic-oriented Intertemporal General Equilibrium Model (IGEM) and the 
international-oriented Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP). We report here on recent analyses 
using these models. 
IGEM 
IGEM is a dynamic model of the U.S. economy that describes economic growth due to 
capital accumulation, technical change, and population growth. Capital accumulation arises from 
savings of a household modeled with “perfect foresight.” The production or supply side of the 
model identifies a total of 35 industries, of which 21 are manufacturing and 5 are energy related. 
Coal, refined oil, gas, and electricity are separately identified energy inputs. Domestic output is 
supplemented by imports from the rest of the world to form the total supply of each commodity. 
The key model parameters governing the behavior of producers and consumers are 
econometrically estimated. In a recent paper, Jorgenson et al. (2007) revised previous analyses 
by Ho and Jorgenson (1994) and Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993) to assess the economic costs of 
a market-based climate policy. Overall, they find that by 2020 the economic burden of a GHG 
mitigation policy that uses a revenue-neutral carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system to 
permanently constrain emissions to year 2000 levels, while measurable, is relatively small—on 
the order of 0.5 to 0.7 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). Substitutions away from 
more costly inputs and toward relatively cheaper materials, labor, and capital, along with price-
induced technical change, help to reduce the adverse impacts.  
                                                 
6 This reflects the EU-ETS design, which does not address cost increases arising from higher electricity prices 
(where higher electricity prices reflect the indirect emissions associated with power generation).  Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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With the exception of agriculture, food, and related activities, Jorgenson et al.(2007) 
project that all industries face declines in output volumes. While coal mining experiences the 
largest impacts on domestic output (about 15 percent in their central case), other energy-related 
industries, including petroleum refining, electric utilities, and gas utilities, all experience output 
declines of 2 to 3 percent. Metal mining, oil and gas extraction, and nonmetallic mineral mining 
also face significant output declines. In the manufacturing sector, the most heavily impacted 
industries are primary metals; stone, clay, and glass; fabricated metal products; nonelectrical 
machinery; motor vehicles; chemicals and allied products; rubber and plastic products; furniture 
and fixtures; and lumber and wood products.  
GTAP 
The GTAP project consists of a multisector (up to 52 industries), multiregion database of 
output and trade flows and a general equilibrium model of the world economy based on this 
database. Although the models using the GTAP data that we describe here do not project energy 
use into the distant future or allow for technological change, they do allow for capital 
reallocation. As such, the results should be considered illustrative of a hybrid of the short-, 
medium-, and long-term time horizons analyzed here. A recent paper by Fischer and Fox (2007) 
based on version 6.1 of GTAP (2001) considers how alternative permit allocation mechanisms 
affect the outcome of carbon policies. They examine four different allocation mechanisms: 
auction, grandfathering, output-based allocation tied to emissions, and output-based allocation 
tied to value added. They report impacts on 18 nonenergy sectors as well as 5 energy sectors. 
In a policy scenario that reduces emissions by about 14 percent below baseline (roughly 
keyed to the goals of the proposed Lieberman-Warner legislation), Fischer and Fox (2007) 
estimate a relatively small reduction in overall output, on the order of 0.34 to 0.51 percent, 
depending on the particular allocation mechanism. The smallest output declines occur for the 
output-based allocation tied to emissions. Overall, output declines consistently across the 
industries examined, except the food products and service sectors, for all the alternative 
allocation mechanisms. Coal mining experiences the largest declines, on the order of 16 percent. 
Other energy-related industries, including electricity, natural gas, and crude oil, also experience 
significant declines, on the order of 5 percent. Transportation and mining are estimated to decline 
by 8 percent and 4 percent, respectively. The most hard-hit manufacturing industries are 
chemicals and iron and steel, at about one percent each. All other manufacturing industries report 
output declines that are generally 0.5 percent or less. Interestingly, the Fischer and Fox (2007) 
analysis reports total emissions leakage of about 12 to 15 percent of the overall reduction in U.S. Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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emissions. Although not explicitly reported in their paper, this implies dramatically higher 
industry-specific leakage rates for some industries.  For example, the leakage rate for the energy 
intensive industries is on the order of 40-45 percent.7 
Adkins and Garbaccio (2007) developed another model based on the GTAP database that 
covers 21 sectors and 24 regions of the world. It considers how carbon taxes interact with trade 
liberalization and revenue recycling. Trade liberalization raises world GDP slightly but also 
raises world carbon emissions, and the authors carry out a simulation where the tariff cuts are 
accompanied by carbon taxes that keep CO2 emissions unchanged. They find that a system of 
carbon taxes, trade liberalization, and revenue recycling reduces the gains from trade 
liberalization quite modestly. Adkins and Garbaccio also consider a case where Annex I 
countries impose a carbon tax to reduce their CO2 emissions by 5 percent and non-Annex I 
countries do not have a carbon constraint. They find that this leads to a net reduction in global 
CO2 emissions of 2 percent, reflecting a leakage rate of 35 percent.8   
III. Methodology to Analyze Different Time Horizons 
As noted, we consider four time horizons for the analysis of the impact of carbon control 
policies, using an IO framework for all cases. This section describes the framework in some 
detail to illuminate the assumptions and simplifications made. Readers more interested in the 
results may skip to Section V. 
We adopt fairly standard IO conventions for the notation in the following equations [see, 
for example, Miller and Blair (1985)]. In order to have a full accounting of all carbon sources 
and users we construct a complete set of accounts for all n industries and final demands 
(consumption, government, and exports). 
Let 
X
j p  denote the price of industry j output to buyers, and 
L
j p  and 
K
j p  denote the price 
of labor and capital inputs. The value of industry j’s output at buyers' prices is equal to the value 
of inputs plus taxes on production: 
 
(1)                                   1,2...
XQ L K
jj i i j j j jj j
i
p Xp u p L p K t a xjn =+ + + = ∑  
                                                 
7  Personal communication with the authors. 




where  j X  is the quantity of output and  ij u  is the intermediate input of commodity i into sector j 
purchased at prices 
Q
i p .  j L  and  j K are the labor and capital inputs. We denote the values of 
output and input by a v superscript: 
vX
jj j X pX =  and 
vQ
ij i ij up u = . 
Both the detailed industry accounts and IO tables distinguish between industries and 
commodities; they are classified by using the same names and reference numbers.9 The 
electricity commodity, for example, is produced by the electric power generation industry, 
federal electric utilities, and state and local (S&L) government electric utilities. Each industry 
uses various intermediate commodity inputs, uij. A matrix whose jth column is the vector of 
commodities used by sector j is the "Use” matrix. In value terms this is: 
 
(2)                     []
vv
ij u = U  
 
The vector of industry output is denoted by  1 ( ,... )' n X XX = . 
For calculations of emissions, we need to express emissions in terms of tons of CO2 
emitted per dollar of output. The "Activity" matrix, B, gives the amount of input i required for 
one unit of output j, and is simply the Use matrix divided by output: 
(3)                   






b b diag X
X
− == = BU  
The symbol diag(x) denotes the matrix where the diagonal consists of the elements of the 
x vector and zeros in the off-diagonal. The corresponding use of labor and capital per unit output 
are denoted as: 








                                                 
9 For example, the accommodation industry produces an "accommodation" commodity and a “food service” 
commodity. On the other side, each commodity may be produced by several industries; for example, the “food 
service” commodity is produced by the accommodation  industry and the food service industry. Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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In our analysis of the very short run we assume that the input mix cannot be changed, that 
is, the activity matrix B is not affected by carbon control policies. 
Total final demand, Ei, is the demand for domestic commodity i by the final users—
consumption, investment, government, and net exports. This corresponds to the familiar 
expression for GDP: GDP = C + I + G + X – M. Thus, for commodity i: 
 
(5)                            i i i i i i i e g v c E − + + + =  ;       1 ( ,... )' n EEE =  
 
Let  i Q  denote the supply of domestic commodity i. The supply–demand balance in 
quantity terms is written as: 
 
(6)                      ∑ = + =
j
i ij i m i E u Q ,.... 2 , 1 ;      [ ] i QQ =  
In vector form this becomes: 
 
(6a)                             QU E XE ι =+ = + B  
 
where ι  is a vector of ones. The corresponding equation in value terms is simply 
vvv QU E ι =+ . 
Since each commodity may be produced by a few industries, we use the “Make” or “Supply” 
matrix: 
 
(7)                                           []
vv




ji V  gives the value of commodity i produced by industry j. The vector of industry output 
is the row sum of the Supply matrix, 
vv X ι = V ; the vector of commodity output is the column 
sum, '
vv Q ι = V . Let the share of commodity i produced by industry j be denoted by dji. Then the 
relation between industry output and commodity supply is given by: 
 
(8)                                   
vv X Q = D ;            
1 [] [ () ]
vv
ji dd i a g Q




We also use the industry proportion matrix, C, which gives the share of industry j’s 
output going to commodity i: 
 
(9)                                 
vv QX = C ;            
1 [] ' [ ( ) ]
vv
ji cd i a g X
− == CV  
 
By putting (3) and (8) into (6), we obtain the following well-known relationship between 
final demand and domestic output [see, e.g., Miller and Blair (1985)]: 
 
(10)                                
1 ()
vv QE
− =− IB D  
 
where I is the identity matrix. 
1 ()
− − IB D is known as the Leontief inverse, or the “commodity 
total requirements matrix.” It tells us that to produce a vector E of final demand commodities, the 
economy must produce a vector Q of gross output of commodities.  
In particular, this formulation expresses the additional outputs required to produce an 
extra unit of good i for final users. For example, if we want to produce one more dollar’s worth 
of motor vehicles, the economy must produce additional steel, glass, electricity, and other 
necessary materials that the motor vehicle industry buys as inputs. However, steel production 
needs motor vehicles, electricity, coal, etc., and electricity needs steel, coal, etc. The Leontief 
inverse gives us the grand total of extra electricity, coal, and so on, that is required for the 
economy to produce one more dollar of motor vehicles. The commodity total requirements 
vector (i.e., the vector of additional output needed for one unit of i) is: 
 




− Δ=− I ΒDi  
 
where  i i is a vector with a one in the ith element and zeros everywhere else. Writing out the 
components of this vector explicitly gives us: 
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With this formulation, we can estimate the total additional CO2 emissions due to one 
more unit of good i since the vector 
i Q Δ  gives us the additional coal, crude oil, and gas used.  
Let  f θ  be the CO2 content per unit of fuel f, where the units are the base year dollars of 
fuel f. For example,  106923 coal θ =  metric tons of CO2 per million dollars of coal in 2002. This is 
derived from the energy content per unit fuel (e.g., BTUs per ton of coal), the carbon content per 
BTU, and the average price per unit fuel (dollars per ton). If there were no noncombustion uses 
of fuels, then the direct and indirect emissions due to producing one unit of good i may be 
derived simply by multiplying the primary energy elements in 
i Q Δ  by their respective carbon 
content coefficients. Let  i C Δ  denote the total carbon emissions caused by producing one unit of 
i: 
 
(13)                                 
'
ii i






Δ= Δ +Δ + Δ
=Δ
 
where ' (0,.., , ,..0) coal oil θ θθ =  is the vector of carbon coefficients with nonzero entries only for 
the primary fuels. Although the 
i Q Δ  vector also gives us the additional electricity and additional 
refined petroleum products used, we do not include them in the calculation since these are 
secondary products. It is the production, not the use, of electricity that generates CO2, and that is 
captured by the coal, oil, and gas elements. Similarly, gasoline, kerosene, and so forth are 
captured at the crude oil stage. 
However, oil and gas are used as feedstock in the production of chemicals and other 
noncombusted products, that is, their carbon is not released in the typical fashion. If the carbon 
policy exempts such nonfuel use then the formulas should reflect that. In this case we estimate 
carbon emissions from the combustion of refined petroleum products and gas utilities instead of 
just the primary commodities from coal, oil mining, and gas mining. We begin with expressing 
total national emissions as the sum over the industries and final demand use of fuel f, and then 




(14)                                  ( ) f fj fj f
fj
Cu E θφ =+ ∑∑  
 
The combustion use of fuel f in industry j is the quantity used (ufj) multiplied by a 
combustion ratio,  fj φ . National emissions also include those from households and government 
represented in the final demand vector E. In matrix notation, this is: 
 
(15)                                  
'[( ) ]

























where  u φi  is the Hadamard product and ι  is a vector of ones. The vector of the change in direct 
and indirect CO2 emissions due to one more unit of final demand is obtained by substituting in 
(11): 
(16)                                     
'
1





⎢⎥ Δ= = − + ⎢⎥
⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
BD I BD I  i  
That is, the change in emissions due to one more unit of commodity i used by final 
demand is: 
(17)                                      [( ) ]
i
if f k f k k j j i
fk j
Cb d Q θ φθ Δ= Δ + ∑∑ ∑  
 
We should emphasize the difference between (13) and (17), which includes the 
combustion ratio term. The refining sector has the smallest combustion ratio where the major 
part of crude input is transformed to refined products, and it is: 
φ (oil mining, refining) = 0.067  
This is very different from 1.0. Thus, (17) generates a very different estimate of the 
carbon intensity for some products. The construction of the combustion ratios is described in 
Appendix A. Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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Given the additional carbon embodied in one unit of commodity i, we may assume that a 
CO2 tax at rate $
C t /ton will result in the cost of producing i rising by 
C
i tC Δ . Denote this by: 
 
(18)                                      
QC
ii p tC Δ= Δ  
 
For nonfuel commodities, say for i = aluminum, then  
Q
aluminum p Δ  is the higher cost due to 
paying more for directly purchased oil and gas as well as for electricity that is generated with 
now more-expensive fossil inputs. For the fossil fuel commodities, say i = coal, the 
Q
coal p Δ  
expression represents the higher cost of producing coal and the carbon tax on coal. 
This expression for the change in input prices is the starting point to estimate the cost of 
carbon mitigation policies from the twin perspectives of the initial industrial purchaser and the 
final end user. The additional cost to final users is the change in price multiplied by the quantity 
purchased of each commodity. The total cost to all final users of a $
C t carbon tax (before any 
changes in behavior) is the sum over all m commodities: 
 








Δ= Δ ∑  
 
The change in costs of industry j is the change in the prices of inputs multiplied by the 
quantity of inputs that are assumed to be unchanged in the very short–run (VS) case. The total 
increase in current costs per dollar of output j is: 
 
(20)                                 
VS Q
j i ij ij
i
COST p B φ Δ= Δ ∑  
We allow for the option that the carbon tax only applies to the combusted portion by 
multiplying the input matrix B by the combustion ratio φ .  
We also want to separate out the total effect into the contribution of primary fuels, 
electricity, and all other intermediate inputs. To do this we compute the carbon contributions of 
the primary fuels and electricity from the energy consumption data given in Table A2 of 
Appendix A. That is, we have, 
DC
j θ = CO2 per dollar of industry output due to the direct Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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combustion (DC) of fossil fuels, and 
EL
j θ = CO2 per dollar due to electricity (EL) consumption. 
The total effect is thus the sum of the direct combustion, electricity, and indirect intermediate 
input (IN) contributions: 
 
(20a)                          
VS DC EL IN
jjjj COST COST COST COST Δ= Δ+ Δ+ Δ 
                       
DCC D C
jj COST t θ Δ=  
                       
EL C EL
jj COST t θ Δ=  
 
We are interested in the total effect on an industry and need to distinguish between 
quantities and values, sales revenues and profits. The gross sales revenue is 
X
jj PX, and net sales 
revenue is the gross minus “taxes on production” (sales tax). Denoting the tax rate by 
X
j t , net 
sales revenue for industry j is: 
 















j P denotes the revenue received per unit of output by the producer, that is, the “seller’s 
price.” Let  j π denote the gross return to capital, that is, net sales revenue minus intermediate 
input costs and labor costs of industry j: 
 
(22)                                  
XO Q L
jj j i i j j j j
i
p Xp B X p L π =− − ∑  
Very Short–Run Horizon Where Quantities Cannot Be Changed 
In the very short–run scenario we calculate the effect of the carbon charge on profits for j 
as if customers do not buy less due to higher prices, that is, there are no changes in the quantity 
of output or inputs. This is best regarded as a very short–run, partial equilibrium view of the 
effects. Here we only focus on industry j and how the higher input prices of all non-j 
commodities affect its profits. We also regard labor prices to be unchanged in this very short–run 




(23)                                     
VS XO Q L
j j j i ij ij j j j
i
Q















That is, under the assumption that quantities are unchanged and the output price is fixed, 
the change in profits is simply the per dollar change in cost given in (20) multiplied by total 
output quantity. This definition of changes in very short–run profits is somewhat inconsistent 
since we consider how the carbon tax results in higher input prices,
Q
i p , while at the same time 
assuming that output prices,
XO
j p , are unchanged for all industries. We define it in this manner to 
reflect the arguments often made by industry representatives: “our costs will rise due to a carbon 
fee and we will not be able to raise prices or change input quantities.” This setup also has the 
advantage of being a simple, transparent representation of the maximum impact on profits from 
the higher costs. This is a simple partial equilibrium representation, ignoring the fact that input 
commodity i is some other industry’s output. 
The percentage change in very short–run profits is simply the weighted share of the 
percentage change in input prices: 
 
(24)                               
Q
VS VS Q ii j i jj
jj j i j i j ii
Q
i jj j i K j









where the α s denote the cost shares: 
 







α = i=1,2,…m 







α =  
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Short-Run Horizon with Higher Output Price and Lower Sales 
In this next case we consider the situation where the producers raise their output prices to 
cover the higher costs and customers react by switching to substitute goods or substitute 
suppliers such as imports. Let the demand elasticity for output j be: 
 







η =  
 
That is, for each percentage point increase in price, the producer j will make and sell  j η  
percent less. That is, the percent change in sales and output due to an increase in price to cover 
the higher cost 
VS
j COST Δ is: 








ηη == Δ 
As in the first case, we assume that labor prices are unchanged. However, we allow a 
certain level of adjustment for inputs—all input quantities other than capital input may change in 
proportion to the reduction in output, but not due to price-induced factor substitution. Let  j dX  
denote the change in the quantity of output produced. The change in intermediate input i and 
labor use are given by: 
(27a)                               
X
j
ij ij j ij j j X
j
dp
dU B dX B X
p
η ==  
                           
X
j LL
jj jj j j X
j
dp
dL b dX b X
p
η ==  
The no-substitution assumption means that the amount of input per unit output is fixed, 
that is,  0 ij dB = . This setup is also not guaranteed to be internally consistent, since the total 
change in purchases calculated from (27) is independent of the change given by  j η , which is 
estimated from a model simulation where substitution is allowed. That is, while we allow the 
customers of j to respond to higher prices, producers of j are still unable to adjust the input mix 
by substituting cheaper inputs for the more expensive carbon-intensive ones. The customers are, 
however, simply other producers. We frame the short-run effect in this manner to show a partial 
equilibrium effect in the simplest way possible. This framework addresses the issue of pass-
through, that is, how much producers can pass on their higher costs in the short run. It allows a Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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generous estimate of the damage to sales due to price changes and, correspondingly, a generous 
estimate of the impact on profits. 
In this short-run case we assume that producers raise the output price by the amount of the 
increase in unit cost due to the carbon tax:  
(28)                                 
XO VS
jj dp COST =Δ  
 
The price to buyers is changed by this higher seller’s price plus the new carbon tax: 
 
(29)                               
(1 )
(1 )










 j = 1,…52 
               /
CC X O




j τ  is the carbon tax rate. The carbon tax is positive only for the energy industries j = coal, 
oil mining, gas mining, gas utilities, and refined petroleum. The change in price is: 
 
(30)                               
XX O C
jj j dp dp t θ =+  
 
And in percentage terms: 







τ =+  
 
The change in profits in this short-run (SR) case is the change in revenues less the change 
in costs, both of which are split into price change and quantity change: 
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(32)                 
SR XO XO Q Q L L
jj j j j i i j j i i j j j j j j
ii
XO X
jj j j XO X Q Q




jj j j X
j
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Xp d p














Recall that the value share of profits in sales revenue is denoted by  Kj α , and the value 
share of labor and intermediate inputs are  Lj α  and  ij α , respectively. Substituting (30) into (31), 
the percentage change in gross profits may be expressed as: 
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Compared to the change for the very short–run horizon case given in (24), the above 
expression has an additional term for the effect of higher output prices on quantities of input and 
output. For the fossil fuel industries, there is also another term, 
C
jj η τ , for the direct effect of 
carbon taxes on the quantities of outputs and inputs in these sectors. That is, the customers of 
fossil fuel industries not only face more costly fuels due to the higher costs of producing fuels, 
but also the carbon tax on the fuels. 
Medium-Term Horizon When Input Mix May Be Changed 
Beyond the short run we would expect firms to adapt their production processes to the 
higher prices of fossil fuels. There may be fuel switching toward lower-carbon fuels, or using 
less energy-intensive intermediate inputs, or substituting labor for energy. In this scenario, which Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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we refer to as the medium run, we allow these changes but assume that capital stocks are not 
changed. We estimate the effects of these changes in variable input use by using a three-region 
general equilibrium model developed by Adkins and Garbaccio (2007).  
Long-Run Horizon When Capital May Be Reallocated 
Over time we may see more changes in production technology than changes in the mix of 
intermediate inputs, for example, the use of more capital-intensive, fuel-efficient technologies. 
Unlike the medium-term horizon case, where we hold the capital stocks in each sector fixed at 
the base case, in this long-run horizon we allow all factors to be mobile. 
IV. Implementation: Data Construction and Simulation Model 
Data 
To obtain accurate estimates of the industry-specific burdens of a CO2 pricing policy, it is 
essential to calculate the carbon usage of each industry, including both direct combustion and the 
purchase of electricity and other intermediate inputs. Thus, two types of information are 
required: IO data on the interindustry flows and outputs measured in value terms; and industry-
specific estimates of the physical quantities of the different fuels consumed. Unfortunately, the 
available value and energy data are not designed to complement each other. While the industry 
economic data are collected in terms of the NAICS, only the energy data for manufacturing are 
collected on the NAICS basis. Energy data for transportation and services are collected on an 
end-use basis. Accordingly, a key challenge is to develop a consistent set of fuel use estimates 
across all sectors. We briefly describe here how the energy and emissions estimates by industry 
are assembled. Details of the calculations are presented in Appendix A. 
The 2002 benchmark IO table is the most recent version produced by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, providing the interindustry flows for 426 sectors, plus information on 
consumption, government, exports, and imports. Development of the industry-specific CO2 use 
involves linking this highly disaggregated value information to the more aggregated fuel data. 
This is accomplished by aggregating the former to match the categorization scheme of the latter. 
At the same time, the list of 426 sectors is not sufficiently detailed for the purpose of identifying 
precisely the use of coal, oil, and natural gas. Thus, we split oil and gas extraction into oil mining 
and gas mining, and petroleum refineries into natural gas liquids (NGL) refining and other 
petroleum refining, and government enterprises into government electric utilities and other 
government enterprises. We had hoped to explicitly identify all the high energy–cost industries Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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in the set of IO industries; however, the energy data available restricted us to a smaller group. 
The final list of 52 industries consists of (a) six-digit NAICS industries that have high energy 
costs and have the energy quantity data available; (b) the energy-supplying industries with coal, 
oil, and gas separated; and (c) the remaining industries aggregated to the three- or four-digit 
level. The identified industries are displayed in Table 1. 
The consumption of energy for the manufacturing industries is taken from the 2002 
Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey (MECS). This data set provides information for a 
detailed group of industries on combustion and nonfuel use of various energy inputs, including 
residual fuel oil, distillate fuel oil, natural gas, LPG, coal, coke, and electricity. Unfortunately, 
for confidentiality reasons, the data for a number of industries are suppressed and we have to 
make alternative estimates as explained in Appendix A. Fossil fuel consumption for the electric 
utility industry is from the Annual Energy Review (AER 2006). Energy use for agriculture is 
provided by the Economic Research Service (ERS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA). Energy use for the other industries is inferred from the value data. 
The methodology assumes that all buyers pay the same price for a ton of coal, a kilowatt-
hour of electricity, or a unit of any other commodity. However, as shown in Tables A3a and A3b 
(Appendix A), there are significant differences between the MECS and the industry-specific fuel 
quantities implied by the IO value data. Thus, we use the MECS, AER and ERS data to develop 
estimates of the quantities of the different fuels used by the reporting sectors.  For other 
industries, the quantities of the different fuels are inferred, based on a residuals calculation 
constrained by national quantities of the fuels. The results of our calculations of energy use by 
the 52 industries are given in Tables A4–A9. 
Given the energy input quantities, we estimate the direct carbon emissions by using the 
carbon coefficients,  f θ . Indirect carbon emissions for electricity consumption are based on the 
carbon embodied in the average kilowatt-hour. The carbon emissions per unit of industry output 
are given in Table A10, and the direct and indirect emissions are displayed in Table A11. 
Multisector General Equilibrium Model 
Key to the analysis are our estimates of the elasticity of demand for industry output, η . 
This is the effect of a higher industry output price on customers’ demand for alternative 
commodities or imports. Since we are not aware of any comprehensive and consistent estimate 
of such elasticities for all industries, we estimate them from a multisector model of the U.S. Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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economy. Thus, we derive the demand elasticity for each industry from a common (and 
consistent) framework. 
To develop these elasticity estimates we turn to the model described in Adkins and 
Garbaccio (2007) and Adkins (2006). This model identifies 21 industries, including 5 energy 
industries—coal, oil, gas, petroleum products, and electricity. The production functions used are 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES), where capital and labor form a “value-added” aggregate 
input, and there is substitution between value-added inputs and the energy bundle (see Appendix 
B).  
To estimate the output elasticity for industry j,  j η , we simulate the model by putting a 
small tax on the output of j and recording the effect of Xj. This is the general equilibrium effect 
of the tax, allowing all intermediate and final demand users to substitute with alternative 
commodities. The estimated demand elasticities are then applied to all the subindustries in our 
list of 52 industries. The elasticity estimated for, say, chemicals, using the Adkins–Garbaccio 
model is applied to all six subindustries in the chemicals group. An exception to this is the 
petroleum refining industry. Here we impose a short-run elasticity of demand that is smaller than 
that generated by simulating the CGE model. We did this because we believe the short-run 
response is significantly smaller than the long-run response to gasoline price changes. 
For the medium- and long-run scenarios, we simulate a carbon tax and use the full 
Adkins–Garbaccio model to estimate the effects on the outputs and inputs of each industry, 
allowing for a full set of substitutions. The quantity of labor demanded, which forms the basis of 
our estimates of job losses, is one of the key factor inputs. 
The regions identified in the model are the United States, the rest of Annex I, and the rest 
of the world.10 The model also calculates the effects of the CO2 tax on industry-specific exports 
and imports, where the tax is defined as a levy on both domestic fuel producers and importers. 
The model simulations presented below do not include a border adjustment or “carbon content 
tax” on imported steel or other energy-intensive manufactures. 
                                                 
10 Annex I refers to those countries that have explicit CO2 targets under the Kyoto Protocol. Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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V. Industry Patterns of Output, Energy Use, Carbon Intensity, and Imports  
Energy Consumption Patterns and Carbon Intensity 
We first describe the energy consumption patterns and carbon content of the 52 industries 
considered in the short-run analyses. Table 1 presents the summary energy consumption 
information for these industries—energy costs as a share of total costs are given for electricity, 
fossil fuel (combusted portion only), and total energy, including noncombustion use of fossil 
fuels. The term “total costs” is defined as the total value of all inputs for industry j given in the 
jth column of the “Use” table which, as shown in (1), is also equal to the value of industry 
output. 
As shown, the relative importance of energy, including feedstocks, as a contributor to 
total costs varies quite widely across the different manufacturing industries, ranging from more 
than 60 percent in the petroleum industry to less than 1 percent in miscellaneous manufacturing, 
motor vehicles, and other transportation equipment. Outside of manufacturing a similarly wide 
range exists, from a high of about 42 percent in gas utilities to 0.2 percent in finance and 
insurance. Even when energy costs are restricted to the combusted portion, the cost share ranges 
from 15 percent in cement to 0.9 percent in transportation equipment. Of the 33 manufacturing 
industries identified here, 15 of them have energy costs exceeding 6 percent of total costs. 
Within the manufacturing sector, the contributors to energy costs also vary greatly. For 
many industries, including petroleum refining, petrochemical manufacturing, other basic organic 
chemical manufacturing, and fertilizer manufacturing, more than 70 percent of the energy costs 
are associated with direct fuel combustion. For others, such as other basic inorganic chemical 
manufacturing, alumina refining and primary aluminum production, and ferrous metal foundries, 
electricity accounts for more than 70 percent of total energy costs. 
Outside of manufacturing, electricity generation (private and government utilities) clearly 
has the highest energy cost share at 13 percent, followed by air transportation services with 9 
percent and farms with 6 percent.  
Table 2 presents the energy consumption data for the 52 industries in physical quantity 
terms: tons of coal, barrels of oil, cubic feet of natural gas, and kilowatt-hours of electricity. It 
also presents the value of industry output and the primary CO2 content per dollar of output, that 
is, the primary CO2 intensity. Primary CO2 includes only the carbon in the fossil fuel combusted 
and in the electricity used: CO2 embodied in intermediate inputs and biomass is excluded. As Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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explained in Appendix A, we define industry output as the value contained in the benchmark IO 
table, less the intraindustry transactions given in the diagonal of the IO matrix.  
Ranked by the value of output, the biggest manufacturing industries are food 
manufacturing, other chemicals and plastics, and computer and electrical equipment. These are 
about 50 times larger than small, energy-intensive industries such as fertilizer, glass, and cement. 
Within manufacturing, the biggest users of coal are iron and steel, and paper mills; the biggest 
user of petroleum products is petrochemical manufacturing; and the biggest users of natural gas 
are food manufacturing, refining, and other basic organic chemicals. Other chemicals and plastic 
is the biggest user of electricity, followed by food manufacturing. 
 Industry-specific estimates of primary CO2 intensity are displayed in the last column of 
Table 2. Clearly, electricity has the highest CO2 intensity among the 52 industries. Within 
manufacturing, cement manufacturing has the highest at 5,100 tons of CO2 per million dollars of 
output, followed by petrochemical manufacturing with 4,100 tons and alumina refining and 
primary aluminum with 2,700 tons of CO2 per million dollars of output. At the other extreme, the 
machinery, electrical machinery, and transportation equipment industries have carbon content 
that is less than 120 tons of CO2 per million dollars of output. 
Import Exposure 
While the vulnerability to import competition is not necessarily related to the average 
level of import penetration, a high import share does indicate greater competition for domestic 
producers. The last column of Table 1 gives the import share of total U.S. consumption by value. 
The contribution of imports to total supply of manufactures in the U.S. market also varies 
greatly, ranging from 73 percent for apparel and 50 percent for computer and electrical 
equipment on the high end to zero for nonferrous metal foundries. In the results presented in the 
next section, the vulnerability to imports or international leakage associated with a unilateral 
increase in the domestic CO2 price depends on the import substitution elasticity, as embodied in 
the Adkins–Garbaccio model, and the import share. 
VI. Effects of a Carbon Tax over Different Time Horizons 
This section presents the results of our four different modeling frameworks. The most 
comprehensive results are available for industrial output, while industry-specific estimates for 
profits, employment, and trade effects are presented for some but not all of the modeling 
horizons. To illustrate the effects of a carbon policy, cap-and-trade, or carbon taxes, we simulate Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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the effects of an economywide carbon tax (
C t ) of $10/ton CO2 (2005$). This tax is first 
converted to 2002 levels to match our base year data. In the first two time horizons, the very 
short run and the short run, we compute the effects on costs by using equations (20) and (20a) for 
each of the 52 industries.  
Effects on Costs and Output—Very Short–Run Horizon 
The estimates of 
VS
j COST Δ  (the percent change in unit costs) are displayed in the first 
column of Table 3, while the remaining columns display the direct combustion, electricity, and 
other intermediate input components: 
DC
j COST Δ , 
EL
j COST Δ , and 
IN
j COST Δ . Recall that in this 
very short–run scenario, firms are regarded as being unable to raise prices, adjust output, change 
input mix, or adopt new technologies. Since the full costs of the carbon charge would be 
reflected in reduced profits, this can be considered a worst-case assessment.  
The most highly affected sector is electricity generation, where costs rise by 8.3 percent. 
Of the 33 manufacturing industries, two (petrochemical manufacturing and cement) are 
estimated to face increases in production costs (reductions in profits) of 4 percent or more. Three 
more manufacturing industries face cost increases exceeding 2 percent—lime and gypsum, iron 
and steel mills, and alumina refining. An additional 14 manufacturing industries and one 
nonmanufacturing industry (air transportation) face production cost increases of 1 to 2 percent. 
The machinery, transportation equipment, and apparel industries have the lowest cost increases 
at less than half a percent. We should emphasize that these are the effects of a $10/ton tax. If 
they are scaled up proportionately to, say, $50/ton of CO2, the costs for iron and steel mills and 
alumina refining will also rise by a factor of five to more than 11 percent. 
Given the mix of energy inputs used in U.S. industry, it is not surprising that the 
contributions of direct combustion, electricity, and other intermediate inputs vary considerably 
across sectors. The most highly affected manufacturing sector, cement, uses large amounts of 
fossil fuel and electricity. It is also responsible for significant carbon emitted in the production of 
key intermediate inputs. Petrochemical manufacturing costs rise by 3.4 percent due to direct 
combustion but only by 0.4 percent each due to electricity and intermediate inputs. Of the 2.6 
percent increase in costs for alumina refining, 1.8 percentage points—about 70 percent—is due 
to electricity use. Electricity is a similarly big contributor for other basic inorganic chemicals and 
mineral wool. 
Intermediate inputs other than electricity constitute the biggest share in only a few of the 
high carbon–input industries—plastic material (0.7 out of 1.4 percent), artificial and synthetic Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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fibers (0.8 out of 1.6 percent), and other nonmetallic mineral products (0.6 out of 1.0 percent). 
For the low CO2–content industries such as machinery and transportation equipment, other 
intermediate inputs are the major contributors to the increased costs of a CO2 charge. We should 
note again here that process emissions have not been included in our analyses. If included they 
would have changed the picture considerably for some sectors, for example, for the nonmetallic 
mineral products group. We should also note that pulp mills represent a special case since 
biomass is a major energy input, although it is ignored in our analysis here. Clearly, the 
treatment of biomass as an energy source would have to be specified under any new policy. 
For the nonmanufacturing group, the cost increases for electric utilities and transportation 
are due mostly to the fossil fuel input. In contrast, for the other nonmanufacturing sectors, the 
CO2 embodied in intermediate inputs is the big source of the burden.     
Effects on Costs, Profits, and Output—Short Run versus the Very Short Run 
In the short-run horizon we assume that producers raise prices to cover the higher unit 
costs. Thus, the change in unit costs is the same as that estimated in the very short–run scenario. 
Unlike the very short–run case, however, where sales and output are fixed, in this scenario the 
higher prices lead to a fall in sales and output as customers switch to alternative goods or 
imports. As described previously, to determine the sales response we estimated the elasticity of 
demand for each industry using the 21-sector, three-region world model. Multiplying the 
elasticities by the percent change in costs due to a $10/ton carbon tax gives our estimate of the 
decline in sales and output (equation 27), as reported in Table 4. 
The reduction in output is large where there is either a large cost change or a highly 
elastic demand response. Among the manufacturing industries, the biggest fall in output is in 
petrochemical manufacturing (–7.7 percent), since it has both a large 4.2 percent increase in 
costs from a $10/ton tax and a large demand elasticity. This is followed by cement with a 4.1 
percent decline in output due to the 5.0 percent increase in costs. Within the chemicals group, 
other basic organic chemicals, plastic materials, and fertilizer are all estimated to experience 
output declines exceeding 3.5 percent due to cost increases of almost 2 percent and a relatively 
high demand elasticity. 
 Among the nonmanufacturing industries, the fuel-producing industries subject to the 
carbon tax see the biggest increase in price (to the buyer, not the producer) and the biggest 
declines in sales. Coal mining, oil mining, and gas utilities experience output declines exceeding Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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5 percent. Electric utilities see the biggest increase in costs and a big reduction in output (1.4 
percent), followed by the transportation industries.  
    A useful set of comparisons can be made from examining the impact of a CO2 charge 
on the profits of different industries. Table 5 displays the percentage change in profits in both the 
very short–run and the short-run models derived from (24) and (33). Recall from Section III that 
we define profits as the gross return to capital, that is, sales revenue less intermediate and labor 
costs. Expressed in this way, in the very short–run two industries, other basic organic chemicals 
and basic inorganic chemicals, face a fall in profits of more than 8 percent from this modest 
carbon tax. Artificial and synthetic fiber manufacturing, and fertilizer also see relatively large 
reductions in profits, exceeding 4 percent.  
However, as firms attempt to pass along the higher costs, even with some reduction in 
sales, a large portion of these losses are recouped for those industries facing inelastic demands, 
that is, for those most able to pass through the higher costs. For example, the 9.4 percent 
reduction in profit in other basic inorganic chemicals in the very short run is reduced to a loss of 
0.2 percent in the short run. That is, about 98 percent of the increased costs may be recouped 
once we relax the constraint on cost passthrough. Similar patterns are seen in most of the other 
manufacturing industries. Those least able to pass on the higher costs are cement (short run loss 
of 0.4 percent compared to very short–run loss of 1.5 percent) and computer and electrical 
equipment (0.10 percent versus 0.22 percent). 
The situation in the fossil fuel producing industries, however, is quite different. In these 
industries the very short–run assumption of no change in output quantities means a smaller loss 
compared to the short-run assumption, when the consumers of fossil fuels react to the carbon tax 
by buying less fuel. In the case of coal mining, in the very short–run horizon we see a 0.30 
percent fall in profits, but when we account for the much lower use of coal after prices rise, the 
fall in profits is 1.1 percent. Similarly, oil mining experiences a fall in profits of 0.51 percent 
when we account for the higher oil prices to consumers compared to the very short–run decline 
of 0.11 percent. 
The other nonmanufacturing industries experience effects similar to those in the 
manufacturing group. For example, truck transportation experiences a very short-run loss of 0.56 
percent compared to a short-run loss of 0.07 percent. 
It is clear from these results that the extent of the variation in both output and profit 
impacts is quite sensitive to the breadth of the industrial categories considered. Within the 
chemicals group (NAICS 325) the very short–run change in profits ranges from 0.3 percent in Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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other chemicals and plastics to 9.4 percent in other basic inorganic chemicals, more than an order 
of magnitude difference. If we had averaged over the whole group, the low estimate for other 
chemicals and plastics would have dominated the results (see the output values in Table 2.) In 
earlier work, Morgenstern et al. (2004) found that subindustry impacts estimated at a four-digit 
classification scheme (based on the Standard Industrial Classification) can be an order of 
magnitude larger those estimated at the two-digit classification level. This is consistent with the 
analysis presented here that also includes some six-digit industries. As discussed in Appendix A, 
here our choice of aggregation level is dictated by the availability of consistent information to 
serve as inputs to the relevant models.  
A further issue involves the scaling of results to different CO2 price levels. Since the 
calculations for the very short– and the short-run are based on a relatively simple linear model, 
they can be readily scaled up or down to reflect different assumptions about CO2 prices. 
However, one has to be careful about the application of the calculated demand elasticities,  j η , as 
these are derived from the parameters in the multisector CGE model and are strictly intended for 
marginal analyses. How the system would respond to large increases in prices is an issue that 
should be carefully considered. In the medium- and long-run horizons examined below, the 
model explicitly involves nonlinearities that cannot be so readily scaled. 
Effects on Output over the Four Time Horizons 
As noted in Section III, the CGE model that we use to consider the longer horizons only 
identifies three-digit–level industries for manufacturing. The complete data for trade flows and 
production parameters allow for a total of 21 sectors instead of the 52 sectors analyzed for the 
very short– and short-run models. To compare the output responses to the more detailed results 
in the short-run scenario we first aggregate the results for the 52 industries in Table 4 to the same 
21 industrial categories. Table 6 displays the effects of a $10/ton of CO2 (2005$) tax on output 
derived from the medium- and long-term models as well as the aggregated short-run effects. 
It should be obvious that the aggregation process results in the loss of quite a bit of 
information. For example, the output effects for the nonmetallic minerals group range from –0.88 
for other nonmetallic mineral products to –4.06 for cement. The group average output effect is 
the 1.2 percent for nonmetallic minerals given in the first column of Table 6. By their very 
nature, the group averages are smaller than the largest effects detected at the more disaggregated 
level and larger than the smallest effects detected at the more aggregated level. Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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Recall that in the medium run producers may substitute among all inputs except for 
capital. Thus, for example, firms may substitute labor for energy or gas for coal. Only in the 
long-run horizon can capital move to other sectors and substitute for energy or labor. 
Furthermore, in the general equilibrium framework both producers and purchasers are changing 
their behavior, and these may have opposing effects on output over time. On one hand, producers 
are substituting inputs to reduce costs and hence prices. Over time, lower prices should help raise 
sales and output. On the other hand, customers are making substitutions to avoid the higher 
prices for carbon-intensive products and thus reducing their demands. 
Looking across the columns of Table 6, from short run to long run, we see these opposing 
effects. The magnitudes of the output reductions generally decline, but not uniformly. That is, the 
cost-reducing effect of input substitution is generally, but not completely, dominant. Over time, 
for all but two manufacturing industries, the cost shock of the carbon tax is reduced, and smaller 
price increases are needed to cover the higher costs of carbon-intensive inputs. Excluding the 
two exceptions, on average, the output losses in the manufacturing industries are reduced by 
about 16 percent between the short and medium time frames and by a further 1 percent between 
the medium- and long-run time frames.11 For example, output losses in the transportation 
equipment industry decline from 1.1 percent in the short run to 0.28 percent in the medium term 
and 0.23 percent in the long run. For primary metals the output loss falls from 1.6 percent to 1.3 
percent in the medium run and to 1.2 percent in the long run.  
For two manufacturing industries, petroleum refining and fabricated metals, the 
flexibility associated with longer time horizons does not lead to reduced impacts. In fabricated 
metals, the short-run reduction in output was estimated to be 0.33 percent, and in the medium run 
it is 0.44 percent. Recall that the short-run effect was estimated by simply multiplying the 
elasticity  j η  by the percent change in unit costs. This is the effect of a simple change in the price 
of good j. The general equilibrium effects considered in the medium run seem to dominate the 
effect of the industry’s own effort to lower costs and prices; the customers’ response to changes 
in all prices is to lower demand for fabricated metals by more than the effect of lower fabricated 
metal prices. That is, the shift in the demand curve is bigger than the movement along the 
demand curve caused by lower prices. From Table 3 we saw that changes in unit costs can vary 
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substantially across sectors; for example, the electricity price rises substantially, while the 
relative price of wood falls.  
Recall that petroleum refining is a special case, where we imposed a smaller elasticity in 
the short run. Thus, the output effect in the medium run is much bigger than the short-run effect. 
Among the nonmanufacturing industries we also see both patterns of diminished and 
expanded output effects over time. For the fossil fuels sectors and services, the effect of 
producers adapting inputs to lower costs dominates, and output losses diminish over time. For 
the other industries, the general equilibrium effects of customers switching even more to 
substitute products dominate, and output declines further over time. 
The changes in industry level outputs as we move from the world of from fixed capital in 
the medium term to one of mobile capital in the long run are quite varied. In three of the twelve 
manufacturing industries, apparel, primary metals, and transportation equipment, the long-run 
effects on output are smaller than those in the medium run. That is, the ability to substitute 
capital for other inputs leads to both lower costs and lower prices, dampening the initial effect of 
the carbon tax. In five industries, food, textiles, lumber, fabricated metals, and other machinery, 
the response is essentially unchanged. That is, the effect of lowering costs by substituting capital 
is canceled out by the general equilibrium effects of all the other changes in the prices. In three 
industries (refining, chemicals, and nonmetallic mineral products) the output reduction in the 
long run is slightly bigger than the medium run. These are the most energy- and carbon-intensive 
industries, and their products experience the biggest price increases. In the medium run their 
customers are limited to substituting alternative intermediate inputs and labor, but in the long run 
they may substitute capital, thereby reducing the demand for these high-carbon content 
intermediate inputs even further. For example, in the medium run nonmetallic mineral products 
experience a 1.14 percent reduction in sales and output, but in the long run they see a 1.20 
percent reduction. 
For one manufacturing industry, electrical machinery, output rises slightly in the long run 
even though it falls in the medium run. This is due to the full-employment assumption; factors 
that are reallocated out of the declining industries have to go somewhere, and some ended up in 
electrical machinery and services. Labor supply is elastic and falls slightly, but the national 
capital stock is assumed to be fixed. Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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Employment and Capital Utilization over Time 
Recall that we have defined the short-run horizon as the period where producers are 
unable to change inputs per unit output, that is, the employment output ratio is fixed. Thus, the 
percentage change in employment due to the imposition of a carbon price is equal to the 
percentage change in output, as shown in Table 3 for the detailed 52 industries and in Table 6 for 
the aggregated 21 industries.  The employment results for the 21 aggregated industries are shown 
in the first column of Table 7. 
In the medium-run case producers may substitute among intermediate inputs and labor, 
while over the long run all inputs, including capital, may be substituted for each other. Thus, in 
both the medium- and long-run cases, labor demand depends on both the output level and the 
degree of substitution among inputs. Clearly, one would expect the impacts to be smaller than in 
the short-run, no-substitution case. Capital use in the long run is driven by two opposing effects. 
On one hand, the outputs of the carbon-intensive sectors are reduced, reducing the demand for 
capital. On the other hand, there is substitution from expensive energy to cheaper capital, which 
increases the demand for capital in these sectors. 
The effects on employment and capital use for the medium- and long-run horizons 
estimated from simulating the general equilibrium model are shown in Table 7. The results 
comparing the short-run to the medium- and long-run cases for employment are similar but not 
identical to the output effects shown in Table 6. In all but two manufacturing industries, the 
reduction in employment is smaller in the medium and long term horizons compared to the short-
run, no-substitution case. For example, in chemicals the short-run reduction of 1.7 percent is 
reduced to 0.81 percent in the medium run and to 0.47 percent in the long run. In primary metals 
the corresponding reductions range from –1.57 percent to –1.10 percent to –0.69 percent, 
respectively.  
Comparing the change in employment to the change in output given in Table 6, we see 
that in more than half the manufacturing industries, the percentage reduction in employment is 
smaller than the reduction in output, indicating some substitution of labor for carbon-intensive 
inputs. In four other manufacturing industries the percentage reduction in labor exceeds the 
reduction in output due to the substitution between capital and labor. Since capital is assumed 
fixed in this scenario, the industry is unable to shed capital given the reduction in sales and 
output. Thus, it makes larger reductions in employment. The higher elasticity of capital–labor 
substitution for petroleum refining leads to the biggest fall in employment of any industry. In the 
case of food manufacturing, employment in the medium run actually rises by a small amount Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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despite the reduction in output, likely due to the small output effect and the strong substitution 
away from carbon-intensive intermediate inputs. Not surprisingly, this is an industry where the 
carbon embodied in the other intermediate inputs is greater than the carbon in the fossil fuel used 
or electricity used.  
Another exception to the general pattern occurs in the case of fabricated metals. Here the 
greater labor reduction in the medium run follows the unusual pattern of a larger output 
reduction in the medium run. Petroleum refining is also a special case that has a greater medium-
run output reduction due to the use of more elastic parameters in the general equilibrium 
calculation. 
Going from the medium to the long run, the reduction in employment diminishes in all 
cases. In two extreme manufacturing cases, apparel and electrical machinery, the medium-run 
employment reductions turn to gains in the long run. That is, the ability to substitute capital for 
the more expensive carbon-intensive inputs in the long run lead to bigger reductions in energy 
consumption and smaller reductions in labor use.  
As noted above, there are two opposing effects on capital use, and the net the effect is 
negative for all but three manufacturing industries. That is, the reduction in capital demand due 
to the reduction in output dominates the substitution of capital for energy in most industries. 
Only in the food, apparel, and electrical machinery industries are the long-run demands for 
capital slightly higher after a carbon tax is in place.  
In the nonmanufacturing industries we also see a smaller employment impact in the 
medium run compared to the short run except for two industries. In the gas industry and other 
mining, the output reduction is bigger in the medium run compared to the short run, and 
employment follows the same pattern. The two fossil fuel mining industries continue to see large 
reductions in employment, albeit smaller than the short-run impacts.  
In the medium run, we assume full employment. Thus, labor that is released from the 
declining sectors moves to the expanding sectors. Services is the big recipient of this released 
labor; the small 0.18 percent change is multiplied by a very large number of workers there. The 
most interesting industry is electric utilities, where output falls by 1.4 percent but employment 
rises by 8 percent in the medium run. This is due to the high value-added substitution elasticity 
for this industry (see Appendix B, Table B5, 
v σ ); the system is trying to substitute away from 
fossil fuel inputs, and since capital is fixed in the medium-run case, the demand for labor 
increases to replace fossil fuels. Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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Going from the medium to long run, the three fossil fuel mining industries actually see 
greater employment losses. That is, the users of fuels substitute capital for fuel over the longer 
term and the demand for coal, oil, and gas falls, leading to lower employment. For agriculture, 
construction, and transportation, the impact is softened over time, as capital moves out of the 
declining sectors and firms move toward the now relatively cheaper labor. The capital that 
moves out of the declining carbon-intensive sectors goes to services and, perhaps surprisingly, to 
the electricity sector. However, given the nest of substitution possibilities in the electricity 
industry this should be expected: the cost of fuel inputs has risen substantially, and the system 
substitutes value added for it, which raises both capital and labor demands. 
The changes due to the carbon tax calculated by the general equilibrium model depend, 
of course, on the functional forms used and the elasticities imposed. Our calculations here are 
certainly not the only plausible ones; other flexible functional forms would have generated a 
different pattern of changes. The key point is that output and employment responses change over 
time and they change due to actions taken by both producers and customers. The adjustments by 
customers may well overwhelm the actions taken by producers to reduce long-run costs, thus 
generating bigger losses over the long run. 
Trade Impacts 
We turn now to the impacts of CO2 pricing on international competitiveness. Up to this 
point we have been discussing the effects on output, profits, and employment. Competitiveness is 
a demand-side issue, that is, how domestic and foreign customers choose between or among 
different suppliers. Domestic consumption is supplied by domestic output less the exported 
portion, plus imports. “Leakage” refers to emissions increases in the rest of the world as a result 
of the domestic policy.  The way we use the term, industry specific leakage is a measure of the 
percent reduction in domestic output that is made up by a change in net imports as a result of the 
domestic policy.  Using this definition, we are recognizing changes in global output flows, but 
not any changes in the carbon intensity of those flows.12 
In simulating the medium- and long-run horizons with the CGE model, we impose a 
carbon tax on fossil fuel consumption that is equivalent to a tax on both domestic fuel output and 
                                                 
12 In a case where all domestic output losses were fully offset by increased foreign output and the CO2 emissions 
intensity was greater than the domestic intensity, global emissions could increase. In the absence of specific data on 
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imported fuels. However, we do not tax imports of manufactured goods to offset the effects of 
the tax on domestic manufacturers. In this framework there is no leakage of carbon reductions 
due to imported coal and oil, but some leakage due to increased imports of manufactured goods. 
The results are displayed in Table 8. 
The first column of Table 8 presents the model base year values for domestic 
consumption of the 21 commodities. National domestic consumption is the sum of consumption 
by firms, households, and government and is equal to domestic output plus imports less exports 
(ignoring changes in inventories, which are not modeled). The second column gives the changes 
in consumption due to a $10/ton CO2 tax, while the last three columns present the contributions 
of the changes in terms of output, imports, and exports. 
 We observe a similar, albeit varied, set of trade impacts across the different industries. In 
the case of chemicals, for example, consumption falls by 0.62 percent. Of that amount, the fall in 
domestic output contributes 1.30 percentage points. However, this output reduction is offset by 
an increase in imports of 0.18 points and a reduction in exports of 0.50 points [–0.62 = –1.30 + 
0.18 – (–0.50)]. Stated alternatively, the large fall in output of 1.1 percent (see Table 6), does not 
lead to a large fall in consumption, as imports rise to make up about 14 percent of the output 
reduction, and the diversion of previous exports to domestic use makes up another 38 percent. 
The result is that consumption of chemicals falls by only 0.62 percent, that is, the reduction in 
global carbon emissions due to a fall in chemical output is not the large 1.1 percent reduction in 
U.S. chemicals–related emissions, but only a 0.62 percent chemicals-related reduction in the 
United States plus a very small reduction in the rest of the world due to more expensive U.S. 
chemical exports. The leakage for chemicals is thus a substantial 52 percent,  more (less) if the 
production in the rest of the world is more (less) carbon intensive than U.S. production. 
We can see a similar pattern for the other carbon-intensive manufacturing industries: a 
modest increase in imports and a bigger reduction in exports. Of the 0.49 percent reduction in 
consumption of nonmetallic mineral products, the rise in imports contributed 0.13 points and 
exports contributed 0.29 points (a 46 percent leakage). Of the 0.66 percent reduction in primary 
metals use, imports contributed 0.16 points and exports 0.30 points (a 41 percent leakage). 
Overall, the emissions increase in the rest of the world is 26 percent of the reduction in 
U.S. emissions as a result of a unilateral U.S. carbon tax. This is a relatively high leakage rate 
but consistent with other studies. World Bank (2008) first cites the IPCC 2001 report as 
estimating leakages in the order of 5-20 percent, and then, after examining the historical shifts in 
trade, concluded there is “some evidence…of leakage of carbon- and energy-intensive industries Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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to developing economies.” Babiker (2005) reports that most studies find leakage rates associated 
with the Kyoto Protocol of 5-25 percent. Babiker’s own calculations, based on a highly 
aggregated model (7 goods, 7 regions), suggests aggregate leakage rates ranging from 20-130 
percent from the Kyoto Protocol. These studies are not directly comparable to our unilateral U.S. 
policy, but do give a sense of the range of possibilities. Fisher and Fox (2007) analyze a 
unilateral policy but consider a complex combination of carbon tax and output subsidies. They 
report an aggregate leakage rate of 12-15 percent. As previously noted, at the industry level there 
is quite a wide range, for example, for the energy intensive industries the leakage rate is 40-45 
percent. Similarly, the leakage rate in Adkins and Garbaccio (2007) is 35 percent. 13   
In this simple one-period model, the trade deficit of each region is held fixed, that is, the 
carbon tax scenario has the same deficit as the base case. The increase in imports and reduction 
of exports of the carbon-intensive commodities are offset by a reduction in imports and an 
increase in exports of other commodities induced by the endogenous exchange rate to maintain 
the trade deficits. The electrical machinery industry actually experiences both a reduction in 
imports and a rise in exports. Recall that petroleum product imports are also subject to a carbon 
tax, and imports of that commodity also fall. 
These trade effects are sensitive to the import elasticities assumed. Since the CGE model 
is quite aggregated with only 12 manufacturing sectors, some of the elasticities are smaller than 
might be appropriate for a more disaggregated set of industries. That is, if we were able to 
conduct this medium-run exercise for the 52 industries that were used for the short-run analysis, 
we would likely see a bigger import response for some commodities and an even bigger degree 
of leakage. Of course, this would be offset by smaller impacts (leakage) in other industries. 
VII. Cross-Model Comparisons                    
Debate on the impact on industry of an economywide carbon tax or cap-and-trade system 
has, quite naturally, focused on the most adversely affected industries. In that context it is useful 
to compare the relative rankings of the different industries across the four modeling horizons 
considered here. Comparing all four time horizons according to the 21 industry classifications 
                                                 
13 Our results differ from those of others for various reasons, including the fact that other models may have different 
amounts of regional detail than ours. Also, some include output subsidies and consider a higher tax rate than we do.  
Since the models are non-linear, our relatively smaller tax may be expected to generate larger leakages compared to 
others. Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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used in our modeling, it appears that the relative rankings are reasonably consistent across all 
horizons, with only a few exceptions (Table 9).14   Thus, among manufacturing industries, 
primary metals, nonmetallic minerals, petroleum refining, and chemicals and plastics rank 
relatively high across all four time horizons, while food, electrical machinery, and apparel rank 
relatively low. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient between the very short run and the 
short run is 0.37; between the short and medium run the correlation is 0.46; and between the 
medium and long runs, the coefficient is 0.97. For nonmanufacturing industries, a roughly 
similar pattern applies.  The corresponding Spearman rank coefficients are –0.33, 0.68, and 0.98, 
respectively. 
As another cross check, we compare the relative rankings of published U.S. and 
European analyses for manufacturing industries (Table 10). Although the industry boundaries are 
not identical across the different studies, the rankings appear roughly similar, with a few notable 
exceptions. For the U.S. studies, the results are quite close, reflecting the common data and 
definitions used in the analyses. When comparing the U.S. and European results, however, the 
differences appear somewhat greater. Most significant is the cement industry, which ranks 
number one in the European case studies prepared by McKinsey (2006) and by Reinaud (2005) 
and number two in the cross-industry study of the United Kingdom developed by Hourcade et al. 
(2007). In contrast, cement is roughly in the top quarter in the U.S. analyses. One possible 
explanation for these differences is the inclusion of process emissions in the European analyses. 
On the assumption that a U.S. emissions control policy would eventually include process 
emissions from cement and other relevant industries, one would expect these industries to move 
up in the rankings to more closely resemble their European counterparts.  
A further difference between the U.S. and European analyses can be seen in the analyses 
of the petroleum refining industry, which ranks high in the United States and only appears in one 
of the European studies. In fact, neither the Reinaud (2005) nor the Hourcade et al. (2007) 
analyses even analyzed petroleum refining. McKinsey (2006) did include it and found that it 
ranked number two behind cement. While petroleum refining is an important industry 
worldwide, it is also a particularly complex one to analyze given the lack of a consensus on the 
short- and long-run demand elasticities for petroleum products. We have used a relatively low 
elasticity for our short-run estimate and thus put the output fall at a modest 0.8 percent per 
                                                 
14 Most notable among the rank changes is petroleum refining, which moved up from roughly the middle of the pack 
in the very short–run and short-run analyses to the most adversely impacted sector in the long run.  Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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$10/ton CO2 tax. When we use the CGE model with larger elasticities, however, the output 
effects are larger, almost 5 percent. This is due to several different effects: the substitution by 
users toward capital and other inputs and the influence of higher petroleum prices on the price of 
oil-intensive commodities; for example, the higher price of transportation fuels reduces the use 
of these fuels.  
VIII. Conclusions 
Any broad-based CO2 pricing policy will have disproportionate impacts on carbon-
intensive, import-sensitive industries. Two key challenges for policy development are to identify 
the hardest hit industries and to understand the full extent and likely duration of the impacts. 
Defining carbon intensity to include the emissions associated with direct combustion as well as 
the purchase of electricity and other intermediate inputs, we use four modeling approaches as a 
proxy for the time horizons over which firms can pass through added costs, change input mix, 
adopt new technologies, and reallocate capital. While our modeling analyses are based on a fairly 
detailed list of industries, further disaggregation would certainly show an even broader range of 
responses.  With this caveat in mind, examination of the results of a $10/ton CO2 charge over 
what we label the very short–, short-, medium-, and long-run horizons yields a number of 
observations: 
 
•  Measured by the reduction in domestic output, a readily identifiable set of industries is at 
greatest risk of contraction over both the short and long terms. Within the manufacturing 
sector, at a relatively aggregate, two- or three-digit industry classification level, the 
hardest hit industries are petroleum refining, chemicals and plastics, primary metals, and 
nonmetallic minerals. 
 
•  Although the short-run output reductions are relatively large in these industries, they 
shrink over time as firms adjust inputs and adopt new technologies. The industries that 
continue to bear the impacts are the same ones affected initially, albeit at reduced levels. 
When impacts are measured in terms of reduced profits, the rebound is especially large 
and, for some industries, virtually complete. 
 
•  Focusing on the nearer-term time frames, where certain simplifying assumptions enable 
us to conduct a more disaggregated analysis, we observe that the greatest harm is 
concentrated in particular sub-segments of these industries. Petrochemical manufacturing 
and cement see very short–run cost increases of more than 4 percent, while iron and steel, 




•  Turning to the nonmanufacturing sector, we see that while the overall size of the 
production losses also decline over time, a more diverse pattern applies. Specifically, the 
impact on electric utilities does not substantially worsen over time compared to other 
industries such as mining, which experiences a continuing erosion of sales, as broader 
adjustments occur throughout the economy. Agriculture faces modest but persistent 
output declines over time, while the service sector is largely unscathed across all time 
horizons. 
 
•  In terms of employment, the short-term job losses are modeled as proportional to those of 
output. Over the longer term, however, when labor markets are able to adjust, the 
remaining losses are fully offset by gains in other industries.  
 
•  Our analysis of trade effects at the relatively aggregate two- or three-digit classification 
level assumes that manufactured products are subject to increased foreign competition 
but fuels are not. That is, while out baseline includes some form of border adjustment for 
fuels per se, no such mechanism is assumed for manufactured goods. We find that pricing 
CO2 emissions increases manufactured imports and reduces manufactured exports in 
parallel with reducing domestic output. Overall, the leakage rate in the long run is 26 
percent when viewed across the entire economy, that is, increases in emissions in the rest 
of the world offset about a quarter of the U.S. reductions. Not surprisingly, the leakage 
rate for the three most energy-intensive sectors – chemicals, nonmetallic mineral 
products, and primary metals – is considerably higher. The leakage rate for these top 
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Table 1. Import Shares and Energy Cost As Share of Total Costs 
   Share of Total Costs (%) 
  Electricity 
Fuel 
combustion 






Food 1.0  0.9  1.9  66.9  8.3 
Textile 3.3  1.1  4.5  60.2  27.2 
Apparel 0.6  0.3  0.9  57.7  73.4 
Wood and furniture  1.4  0.4  1.7  57.9  21.8 
Pulp mills                                                 3.0  5.6  8.8  64.5  45.8 
Paper mills                                               4.9  3.7  8.6  55.2  20.6 
Paperboard mills                                      5.1  5.8  11.0  57.4  0.5 
Other papers  1.1  0.4  1.5  57.4  4.5 
Refining–LPG 1.3  7.0  69.8  88.1  0.0 
Refining–other 1.3  7.0  69.9  88.1  12.3 
Petrochemical manufacturing                  5.3  26.4  46.5  77.6  10.0 
Other basic inorganic chemical mfg.       11.2  1.8  13.9  67.0  28.4 
Other basic organic chemical mfg.          3.8  6.8  22.4  80.3  25.7 
Plastics material and resin mfg.      2.7  3.8  21.9  81.4  15.3 
Artificial and synthetic fibers, 
filaments                                2.5 4.1  6.7  78.7  13.8 
Fertilizer manufacturing                          3.6  13.3  36.0  80.3  26.7 
Other chemical and plastics  1.8  0.7  2.7  52.2  20.8 
Glass container manufacturing                5.9  6.3  12.2  49.2  13.5 
Cement manufacturing                            11.6  11.3  23.4  49.5  14.3 
Lime and gypsum product mfg.               1.8  4.6  6.6  58.6  2.1 
Mineral wool manufacturing                   5.1  4.0  9.2  53.5  7.3 
Other nonmetallic mineral  1.9  2.7  4.7  53.8  18.1 
Iron and steel mills, ferroalloy mfg.        9.0  5.9  15.6  59.4  22.1 
Alumina refining, primary aluminum      19.8  7.3  27.6  51.6  29.8 
Ferrous metal foundries                           3.7  1.1  4.8  45.3  3.1 
Nonferrous metal foundries                     1.9  1.4  3.3  59.3  0.0 
Other primary metals  4.4  1.9  6.3  61.6  41.1 
Fabricated metals  1.4  0.5  1.9  52.6  12.7 
Machinery 0.7  0.2  0.9  57.3  29.3 
Computer and electrical equipment  0.9  0.3  1.2  52.9  49.8 
Motor vehicles  0.7  0.3  1.0  62.6  41.9 
Other transportation equipment  0.7  0.2  0.9  54.5  27.8 
Miscellaneous  manufacturing  0.6  0.2  0.7  46.6  40.1 
Nonmanufacturing industries 
Farms 1.5  2.2  3.9  58.5  8.5 Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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Forestry, fishing, and hunting  0.2  1.6  1.9  37.6  22.0 
Oil mining  1.3  1.1  2.4  48.0  59.8 
Gas mining  1.3  1.1  2.4  48.0  33.1 
Coal mining  2.0  1.8  3.9  45.2  3.4 
Other mining activities  2.4  2.6  5.1  48.8  0.8 
Electric utilities (including 
government enterprises)  0.0  13.1  13.2  31.7  0.5 
Gas utilities  0.0  0.1  43.4  66.5  0.0 
Construction 0.3  2.2  2.7  50.0  0.0 
Trade 0.8  0.3  1.2  31.4  –1.2 
Air transportation  0.1  9.5  10.4  45.7  17.8 
Truck transportation  0.3  5.6  6.4  51.3  1.2 
Other transportation  0.7  3.7  4.6  37.0  –2.8 
Information 0.3  0.3  0.6  34.2  0.6 
Finance and insurance  0.2  0.1  0.2  21.1  2.5 
Real estate and rental  0.8  0.1  0.9  22.2  0.0 
Business services  0.4  0.7  1.1  22.9  0.5 
Other services  1.1  0.4  1.5  39.0  0.1 
Government excluding electricity  0.5  1.9  2.6  37.8  0.0 




































Food 470.4  9.1  0.0  1.4  21.2  605.0  75.2  224.9 
Textile  59.7  1.0  0.0  0.6 3.5 100.0  30.1  461.9 
Apparel  44.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.3 20.0  4.3  88.2 
Wood and furniture  136.1  0.0  0.0  1.5  2.2  80.0  28.0  168.1 
Pulp mills                                           3.4  0.3  0.0  0.0  2.1  23.0  1.6  1050.2 
Paper mills                                          45.3  13.2  0.0  0.4  8.2  216.0  34.0  1362.5 
Paperboard mills                                21.1  3.8  0.0  0.1  5.6  183.0  16.4  1409.4 
Other  papers  173.3  0.2  0.0  1.3 1.0 113.0  28.3  142.1 
Refining–LPG  21.0  1.0  40.2  0.0 0.0 94.1  4.1  1280.6 
Refining–others  169.8  11.6  325.1  6.0 0.0 759.9  33.1  1327.8 
Petrochemical manufacturing            14.7  1.1  2.2  156.5  7.3  168.0  11.9  4118.3 
Other basic inorganic chemical 
mfg.                                       15.2  0.9  0.2  0.8 0.9 66.5  25.9  1444.1 
Other basic organic chemical mfg.    47.6  7.1  2.1  32.2  11.0  479.0  27.5  1474.5 
Plastics material and resin mfg.      44.8  1.2  1.4  10.0  0.2  291.2  18.6  731.5 
Artificial and synthetic fibers, 
filaments                                7.7  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.8  55.2  2.9  792.0 
Fertilizer manufacturing                     8.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.6  203.0  4.5  1716.6 
Other chemicals and plastics  403.1  3.5  0.1  5.1  15.4  473.0  109.9  267.6 
Glass container manufacturing           4.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  51.0  3.9  1197.3 
Cement manufacturing                       7.1  10.6  0.0  0.0  16.1  21.0  12.5  5080.7 
Lime and gypsum product mfg.         4.9  3.0  0.0  0.0  4.4  7.0  1.4  1775.0 
Mineral wool manufacturing              4.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  34.0  3.8  884.6 
Other nonmetallic mineral  67.0  0.3  0.0  0.6  6.8  297.0  19.9  477.7 
Iron and steel mills, ferroalloy 
mfg.                                         41.9  19.0  0.0  0.0  1.9  383.5  57.5  2242.7 
Alumina refining, primary  18.8  0.0  0.0  0.1  22.9  127.0  56.7  2717.7 Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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aluminum                                          
Ferrous metal foundries                     14.7  0.2  0.0  0.2  0.3  26.9  8.2  477.1 
Nonferrous metal foundries               11.4  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  30.0  3.2  321.0 
Other  primary  metals  28.4  0.6  0.0  0.7 2.2 84.0  18.9  645.7 
Fabricated  metals  219.3  0.0  0.0  0.9 1.4 204.0  47.1  186.8 
Machinery  221.6  0.1  0.0  1.1 1.0 80.0  24.6  91.5 
Computer and electrical 
equipment 363.6  0.0  0.0  0.4  12.0  114.0  52.3  119.1 
Motor  vehicles  326.2  0.0  0.0  0.9 3.8 154.1  36.3  99.7 
Other transportation equipment  134.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.1  43.5  14.2  89.2 
Miscellaneous    manufacturing  115.1  0.0  0.0  0.2 0.4 31.0  10.4  72.1 
Nonmanufacturing industries 
Farms 177.3  0.1  0.0  0.0  119.9  58.0  41.1  430.5 
Forestry, fishing, and hunting  34.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  18.1  1.4  0.9  227.4 
Oil  mining  61.1  0.1  0.0  0.0 8.7 71.7  12.4  248.8 
Gas  mining  41.1  0.1  0.0  0.0 5.9 48.3  8.3  248.8 
Coal  mining  19.3  0.0  0.0  0.0 5.2 36.3  5.8  394.8 
Other mining activities  57.1  0.2  0.0  0.0  22.4  151.1  21.0  533.1 
Electric utilities (including 
government enterprises)  259.6  977.5  0.0  0.0  91.4  5,676.8  0.0  8647.6 
Gas  utilities  82.6  0.0  0.0  0.0 2.2 0.0  0.4  13.7 
Construction 966.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  669.2  123.4  44.7  310.2 
Trade 1,850.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  145.5  349.7  232.8  119.1 
Air transportation  99.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  311.0  0.8  1.2  1250.7 
Truck transportation  194.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  357.0  23.0  8.4  760.7 
Other transportation  329.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  337.2  634.0  32.9  573.5 
Information 824.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  32.4  275.0  42.3  65.5 
Finance and insurance  1,138.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  14.7  45.5  26.1  21.4 
Real estate and rental  1,932.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  59.3  172.2  222.3  88.0 
Business services  1,710.9  0.1  0.0  0.0  352.6  307.7  100.1  127.8 
Other services  2,370.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  106.1  1,079.7  403.6  147.7 
Government excluding electricity  2,043.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  910.4  2,795.9  159.3  300.0 





Table 3. Very Short–Run Time Horizon: Estimated Percent Increase in Production Costs 












Food 0.6  0.1  0.1  0.4 
Textile 0.8  0.1  0.3  0.4 
Apparel 0.4  0.0  0.1  0.3 
Wood and furniture  0.4  0.0  0.1  0.3 
Pulp mills                                           1.3  0.7  0.3  0.3 
Paper mills                                          1.6  0.8  0.4  0.3 
Paperboard mills                                 1.6  0.9  0.5  0.2 
Other papers  0.6  0.0  0.1  0.5 
Refining–LPG 1.4  1.1  0.1  0.1 
Refining–others 1.4  1.1  0.1  0.1 
Petrochemical mfg.                            4.2  3.4  0.5  0.4 
Other basic inorganic chemical 
mfg.                                          1.6  0.4  1.0  0.2 
Other basic organic chemical mfg.     2.0  1.1  0.3  0.6 
Plastics material and resin mfg.      1.4  0.4  0.2  0.7 
Artificial and synthetic fibers, 
filaments                                1.6  0.5  0.2  0.8 
Fertilizer manufacturing                     1.8  1.3  0.3  0.2 
Other chemical and plastics  0.7  0.1  0.2  0.4 
Glass container manufacturing           1.3  0.6  0.5  0.1 
Cement manufacturing                       5.0  3.8  1.0  0.2 
Lime and gypsum product mfg.         2.1  1.5  0.2  0.5 
Mineral wool manufacturing              1.1  0.4  0.5  0.3 
Other nonmetallic mineral  1.0  0.3  0.2  0.6 
Iron and steel mills, ferroalloy 
mfg.                                         2.3  1.3  0.8  0.2 
Alumina refining, primary 
aluminum                                           2.6  0.8  1.8  0.1 
Ferrous metal foundries                      0.7  0.1  0.3  0.2 
Nonferrous metal foundries                0.8  0.1  0.2  0.5 
Other primary metals  1.0  0.2  0.4  0.4 
Fabricated metals  0.6  0.1  0.1  0.4 
Machinery 0.4  0.0  0.1  0.3 
Computer and electrical 
equipment 0.3  0.0  0.1  0.2 
Motor vehicles  0.5  0.0  0.1  0.4 
Other transportation equipment  0.3  0.0  0.1  0.3 
Miscellaneous manufacturing  0.3  0.0  0.1  0.3 




Farms 0.7  0.3  0.1  0.3 
Forestry, fishing, and hunting  0.4  0.2  0.0  0.2 
Oil mining  0.4  0.1  0.1  0.2 
Gas mining  0.4  0.1  0.1  0.2 
Coal mining  0.6  0.2  0.2  0.2 
Other mining activities  0.7  0.3  0.2  0.2 
Electric utilities (including 
government enterprises)  8.3  8.2  0.0  0.1 
Gas utilities  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1 
Construction 0.5  0.3  0.0  0.2 
Trade 0.2  0.0  0.1  0.1 
Air transportation  1.4  1.2  0.0  0.3 
Truck transportation  1.0  0.7  0.0  0.3 
Other transportation  0.7  0.5  0.1  0.1 
Information 0.2  0.0  0.0  0.1 
Finance and insurance  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1 
Real estate and rental  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1 
Business services  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.1 
Other services  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.1 
Government excluding electricity  0.4  0.1  0.0  0.1 
 
 




equilibrium effect only 




Wood and furniture  –0.34 
Pulp mills                                              –1.00 
Paper mills                                            –1.08 
Paperboard mills                                   –1.11 
Other papers  –0.46 
Refining–LPG –0.68 
Refining–others –0.79 
Petrochemical mfg.                               –7.65 
Other basic inorganic chemical mfg.    –1.92 
Other basic organic chemical mfg.       –3.66 
Plastics material and resin mfg.      –3.95 
Artificial and synthetic fibers, 
filaments                                –1.83 
Fertilizer manufacturing                       –3.58 
Other chemical and plastics  –1.00 
Glass container manufacturing             –1.04 Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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Cement manufacturing                          –4.06 
Lime and gypsum product mfg.            –1.73 
Mineral wool manufacturing                –0.97 
Other nonmetallic mineral  –0.88 
Iron and steel mills, ferroalloy mfg.      –2.06 
Alumina refining, primary 
aluminum                                            –2.42 
Ferrous metal foundries                        –0.68 
Nonferrous metal foundries                  –0.78 
Other primary metals  –1.08 
Fabricated metals  –0.33 
Machinery –0.76 
Computer and electrical equipment  –1.00 
Motor vehicles  –1.24 
Other transportation equipment  –0.89 
Miscellaneous manufacturing  –0.65 
Nonmanufacturing industries 
Farms –0.56 
Forestry, fishing, and hunting  –0.41 
Oil mining  –5.09 
Gas mining  –6.34 
Coal mining  –11.01 
Other mining activities  –0.49 
Electric utilities (including 
government enterprises)  –1.35 
Gas utilities  –4.95 
Construction –0.42 
Trade –0.16 
Air transportation  –1.05 
Truck transportation  –0.72 
Other transportation  –0.52 
Information –0.13 
Finance and insurance  –0.06 
Real estate and rental  –0.10 
Business services  –0.15 
Other services  –0.21 
Government excluding electricity  –0.31 
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Very short run 
(quantities fixed) 
Short run          
(output changed) 
Manufacturing industries 
Food –0.39  –0.04 
Textile –0.80  –0.11 
Apparel –0.24  –0.10 
Wood and furniture  –0.49  –0.03 
Pulp mills                                           –0.85  –0.10 
Paper mills                                          –0.61  –0.11 
Paperboard mills                                –0.63  –0.11 
Other papers  –0.47  –0.05 
Refining–LPG –1.59  –0.07 
Refining–others –1.92  –0.08 
Petrochemical mfg.                            –2.26  –0.76 
Other basic inorganic chemical 
mfg.                                          –9.38  –0.19 
Other basic organic chemical mfg.     –8.64  –0.37 
Plastics material and resin mfg.      –3.70  –0.40 
Artificial and synthetic fibers, 
filaments                                –6.51  –0.18 
Fertilizer manufacturing                     –4.71  –0.36 
Other chemical and plastics  –0.34  –0.10 
Glass container manufacturing           –0.50  –0.10 
Cement manufacturing                       –1.52  –0.41 
Lime and gypsum product mfg.         –0.94  –0.17 
Mineral wool manufacturing              –0.51  –0.10 
Other nonmetallic mineral  –0.64  –0.09 
Iron and steel mills, ferroalloy 
mfg.                                         –1.34  –0.21 
Alumina refining, primary 
aluminum                                           –1.10  –0.24 
Ferrous metal foundries                     –0.43  –0.07 
Nonferrous metal foundries               –1.36  –0.08 
Other primary metals  –0.81  –0.11 
Fabricated metals  –0.51  –0.03 
Machinery –0.35  –0.08 
Computer and electrical 
equipment –0.22  –0.10 
Motor vehicles  –0.33  –0.12 
Other transportation equipment  –0.28  –0.09 
Miscellaneous manufacturing  –0.17  –0.06 
Nonmanufacturing industries 
Farms –0.21  –0.06 
Forestry, fishing, and hunting  –0.18  –0.04 Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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Oil mining  –0.11  –0.51 
Gas mining  –0.11  –0.63 
Coal mining  –0.30  –1.10 
Other mining activities  –0.36  –0.05 
Electric utilities (including 
government enterprises)  –2.11  –0.14 
Gas utilities  –0.06  –0.49 
Construction –0.44  –0.04 
Trade –0.11  –0.02 
Air transportation  –1.11  –0.10 
Truck transportation  –0.56  –0.07 
Other transportation  –0.41  –0.05 
Information –0.05  –0.01 
Finance and insurance  –0.02  –0.01 
Real estate and rental  –0.02  –0.01 
Business services  –0.09  –0.01 
Other services  –0.20  –0.02 
Government excluding electricity  –0.39  –0.03 
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Food –0.38  –0.11  –0.12 
Textile –1.13  –0.51  –0.50 
Apparel –1.03  –0.18  –0.07 
Lumber, wood, paper  –0.53  –0.32  –0.32 
Petroleum refining  –0.78  –4.72  –5.36 
Chemical and plastics  –1.74  –1.11  –1.26 
Nonmetallic mineral  –1.20  –0.86  –0.94 
Primary metals  –1.57  –1.30  –1.21 
Fabricated metals  –0.33  –0.44  –0.43 
Transportation equipment  –1.14  –0.35  –0.27 
Electrical machinery  –1.00  –0.13  0.08 
Other machinery and 
miscellaneous mfg.  –0.72  –0.50  –0.49 
Nonmanufacturing industries 
Agriculture –0.54  –0.58  –0.68 
Coal mining  –11.01  –4.89  –7.85 
Oil mining  –5.60  –1.02  –2.09 
Gas     –4.95  –5.33  –10.04 
Other mining  –0.49  –0.74  –1.06 
Electric utilities  –1.35  –1.37  –1.17 
Construction –0.42  –0.32  –0.39 
Transportation    –0.67  –1.02  –1.15 
Services –0.17  0.05  0.06 
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   Short run   Medium run   Long run   Long run  
Manufacturing industries 
Food –0.38  0.06  0.08  0.02 
Textile –1.13  –0.52  –0.32  –0.38 
Apparel –1.03  –0.10  0.05  0.00 
Lumber, wood, paper  –0.53  –0.25  –0.10  –0.18 
Petroleum refining  –0.78  –5.64  –3.86  –3.93 
Chemical and plastics  –1.74  –0.81  –0.47  –0.55 
Nonmetallic mineral  –1.20  –0.67  –0.42  –0.49 
Primary metals  –1.57  –1.10  –0.69  –0.77 
Fabricated metals  –0.33  –0.44  –0.30  –0.37 
Transportation equipment  –1.14  –0.32  –0.15  –0.23 
Electrical machinery  –1.00  –0.05  0.21  0.13 
Other machinery and 
miscellaneous mfg.  –0.72  –0.55  –0.33  –0.41 
Nonmanufacturing industries 
Agriculture –0.54  –0.12  –0.09  –0.09 
Coal mining  –11.01  –8.12  –10.15  –10.13 
Oil mining  –5.60  –2.14  –2.77  –2.80 
Gas     –4.95  –5.71  –9.15  –9.17 
Other mining  –0.49  –0.80  –0.99  –0.98 
Electric utilities  –1.35  8.08  3.52  3.44 
Construction –0.42  –0.35  –0.33  –0.40 
Transportation    –0.67  –0.46  –0.34  –0.43 
Services –0.17  0.18  0.16  0.07 
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with CO2 tax 
(% change)  Output Imports  Exports 
Manufacturing industries 
Food 5,556  –0.03  –0.12  0.03  –0.06 
Textile 1,232  –0.30  –0.45  0.05  –0.11 
Apparel 1,605  0.10  –0.05  0.12  –0.02 
Lumber, wood, paper  5,006  –0.25  –0.31  0.02  –0.05 
Petroleum refining  1,579  –5.88  –5.61  –0.28  0.00 
Chemical and plastics  5,569  –0.62  –1.30  0.18  –0.50 
Nonmetallic mineral  967  –0.49  –0.91  0.13  –0.29 
Primary metals  2,182  –0.66  –1.11  0.16  –0.30 
Fabricated metals  2,278  –0.40  –0.43  –0.01  –0.03 
Transportation equipment  5511  –0.22  –0.25  –0.02  –0.06 
Electrical machinery  3,368  –0.19  0.07  –0.14  0.12 
Other machinery and 
miscellaneous  mfg.  7,014 –0.39  –0.47  –0.04  –0.12 
Nonmanufacturing industries 
Agriculture 2,452  –0.27  –0.72  0.11  –0.34 
Coal mining  253  –17.24  –10.15  –0.44  6.65 
Oil mining  1067  –5.51  –1.07  –4.32  0.12 
Gas     463  –10.68  –9.50  –1.22  –0.05 
Other mining  275  –0.96  –1.03  –0.02  –0.09 
Electric utilities  2,344  –1.00  –1.17  0.13  –0.04 
Construction 9,936  –0.39  –0.39  0.00  0.00 
Transportation    5,352  –0.76  –1.18  0.08  –0.33 
Services 80,941  0.05  0.06  0.00  0.01 
* From Adkins and Garbaccio (2007) model using a 1997 base year.  
** Domestic consumption = output + imports – exports. 
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per $10/ton CO2 
tax (2005$) 


















Primary metals  1  1  2  3 
Nonmetallic mineral  2  4  4  4 
Petroleum refining  3  8  1  1 
Chemical and plastics  4  3  3  2 
Textile 5  5  5  5 
Lumber, wood, paper  6  10  9  8 
Fabricated metals  7  12  7  7 
Food 8  11  12  10 
Transportation equipment  9  2  8  9 
Other machinery and 
miscellaneous mfg.  10  9  6  6 
Apparel 11  6  10  11 
Electrical machinery  12  7  11  12 
Spearman rank correlation 
     Very short vs. short run    0.37     
     Short vs. medium run      0.46   
     Medium vs. long run        0.97 
Nonmanufacturing industries 
Electric utilities  1  4  3  4 
Transportation    2  8  5  5 
Other mining  3  7  6  6 
Agriculture 4  6  7  7 
Coal mining  5  1  2  2 
Construction 6  9  8  8 
Oil mining  7  2  4  3 
Services 8  5  9  9 
Gas     9  3  1  1 
Spearman rank correlation 
     Very short vs. short run    –0.33     
     Short vs. medium run      0.68   
     Medium vs. long run        0.98 Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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Table 10. Comparison with Other Studies: Most Affected Manufacturing  




No.  Jorgenson et al.  Fischer–Fox  Hourcade et al.  McKinsey  Reinaud 
1 Coal  mining  Coal  Lime  Cement  Cement 
2 
Gas utilities 
(services) Electricity  Cement Refining  BOF  steel 
3 Petroleum  refining 
Petroleum and coal 









Aluminum  Aluminum 
5  Primary metals  Transport equipment 
Fertilizers and 
nitrogen 
compounds   Paper  EAF steel 
6 
Nonmetallic mineral 
mining  Agriculture Aluminum EAF  steel   
7 Metal  mining  Construction 
Other inorganic 
basic chemicals     
8 
Stone, clay, and glass 
products Chemistry  industry 
Pulp, paper, and 
paperboard    
9 Motor  vehicles Food  products Malt     
10 
Nonelectrical 
machinery Paper–pulp–print  Coke oven products     
11 
Chemicals and allied 




Iron and steel 
industry Nonwovens    
13 




Household and  
sanitary goods     
14  Electrical machinery  Natural gas  Finishing of textiles     
15  Furniture and fixtures  Transport equipment  Hollow glass     
16 
Lumber and wood 
products  Other machinery 
Rubber tires and 
tubes    
17 
Rubber and plastic 
products 









plywood, etc.    
19  Instruments  Other services  Flat glass     
20 
Other transportation 
equipment Other  manufacturing 
Other textile 
weaving    
21 Textile  mill  products 
Trade, wholesale 
and retail  Copper     
22 
Paper and allied 
products  
Throwing 
preparation      





Wholesale and retail 
trade        
25 
Transportation and 
warehousing        
26 
Printing and 
publishing        
27 
Leather and leather 
products       
28 
Government 
enterprises        
29 
Finance, insurance, 
and real estate        
30 
Apparel and other 
textile products         
31 Communications         
32 
Personal and 
business services         
33 
Agriculture, forestry, 
fisheries        
34 
Food and kindred 
products        
35 
Tobacco 
manufactures             
 
BOF = basic oxygen furnance; EAF = electric arc furnace. Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
 
  58
Appendix A. Data  
The primary data for our analysis is drawn from the 2002 IO table for the U.S. and 
manufacturing energy use data from the Energy Information Administration (EIA). In this 
appendix we describe how we estimate the outputs and inputs, including energy inputs, for the 
52 industries identified in our study from these primary data. In doing this we highlight 
weaknesses in the primary data that, hopefully, can be strengthened in future versions. 
A.1 Constructing an Input–Output Matrix for 2002 
The Bureau of Economic Analysis produced 2002 benchmark IO data with detailed 
information on output and intermediate inputs for 428 commodities and 426 industries. From the 
2002 benchmark based on the NAICS classification, we aggregated the entire IO table into a 50-
commodities and 50-industries “Use” matrix as well as a 50-industries and 50-commodities 
“Make” matrix. The electric utility sector includes electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution; federal electric utilities; and state and local government electric utilities. Oil and gas 
mining is one sector in the original IO table. We split the commodity of oil and gas mining into 
two, oil mining and gas mining, on the basis of the commodity proportions. We also split the 
petroleum industry into refining–liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and refining–others by using the 
same procedure. In the end, we have 52 industrial/commodity sectors. We update the IO values 
of seven fuels, including coal, crude oil, gas mining, refining–LPG, refining–others, and natural 
gas, by using EIA’s MECS data. (We discuss the process of updating the seven individual fuel 
commodities later in this appendix.)  We rebalance the Use matrix for the cells not in the seven 
fuel commodities constrained on the row (intermediate commodity consumption) and column 
(intermediate industrial output) sums. We follow a similar procedure for the Make matrix.                                    
The resulting 52 industrial sectors are displayed in the first column of Table A1. The 
values of industry and commodity output from IO tables (in millions of dollars) for our 52 
industries are given in the second and third columns of Table A1 (in millions of dollars). These 
are domestic industry output values; the U.S. accounts distinguish between industries and 
commodities—each industry may make several commodities and each commodity may be made 
by a few industries. The domestic output classified by commodities is given in the third column 
in Table A1. Domestic consumption of commodities is output plus imports, less exports, plus 
inventory change. Consumption levels are displayed in the last column of Table A1. We can see 
that total consumption is close to domestic output (i.e., net imports are small) for most items, but 
large for oil mining and apparel. Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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Total consumption is the sum of intermediate input purchases by industries and final 
demand. Final demand refers to purchases for consumption, investment, government, and 
exports. Given the focus on energy inputs, we provide the detailed estimates of input values of 
the seven energy commodities (oil mining, gas mining, coal mining, electric utilities, gas 
utilities, refining–LPG, and refining–others) for each of the 52 industries and final demand in 
Table A2. We note that these are gross purchases used for feedstocks and for combustion. They 
should not be simply added to obtain total national consumption. For example, petroleum 
refining buys a lot of crude oil from “oil and gas mining,” and its output is purchased by all 52 
industries and final demand. 
A.2 Energy Use 
We estimate CO2 emissions for the 52 industrial sectors by using quantities of fuel 
combusted. We consider seven different types of energy sources: coal, crude oil, natural gas 
from gas mining, natural gas from gas utility, refining–LPG, refining–others, and electricity. The 
quantities of these energies are mainly from the MECS, the Annual Energy Review (AER), the 
IO table, the USDA, and our own estimates. MECS is our major source of energy consumption 
quantity data for manufacturing sectors. It is complemented by AER and USDA energy quantity 
data. We then use economywide energy consumption value data from the IO table and quantity 
data from AER to estimate energy consumption quantity data for other sectors. In the following 
section, we discuss the development of price and quantity data for these seven energy sources. 
One common way of estimating the quantity of energy use at this level of aggregation is 
to assume that every purchaser pays the same economy average price and to apply that price to 
the values in the IO table. As we noted earlier in Morgenstern et al. (2004), that is a poor 
assumption for some industries (e.g., aluminum smelting pays a much lower average price for 
electricity than other industries). We thus turn to independent measures of energy use quantities 
to compare with the estimates derived from IO dollar values. 
A.2.1 Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey 
MECS is the federal government’s most comprehensive source of information on energy 
use by U.S. manufacturing. MECS collects data on energy consumption and expenditures, fuel-
switching capability, onsite generation of electricity, by-product energy use, and other energy-
related topics. The manufacturing sector is defined according to NAICS. The manufacturing 
sector (NAICS Sectors 31–33) consists of all manufacturing establishments in the 50 states and 
the District of Columbia. Our analysis is based on 2002 data. Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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MECS reports the quantities of coal, coke, residual fuel oil, distillate fuel oil, natural gas, 
LPG and NGL, and net electricity for the manufacturing industries at the six-digit NAICS 
level.15 Specifically, the 2002 MECS Table 1.1 gives the information of Consumption of Energy 
for All Purposes (First Use); Table 2.1 gives information of Energy Used as a Nonfuel 
(Feedstock); and Table 3.1 provides data on Energy Consumption as a Fuel. Some energy 
quantity data are either too small (*) or withheld (W, Q). We treat the small numbers as zeros. 
For data which were withheld, we scale from available information. We also adopt other 
methods to estimate missing values, for example, energy balance. We use the totals for the three-
digit industries corresponding to our manufacturing industrial list. The total quantities of coal, 
oil, and gas for our 32 manufacturing industries are given in Tables A3a. We estimate the 
feedstock ratios by using MECS Tables 1.1 and 2.1. For comparison, we also derive the quantity 
of energy combusted in Table A3b, using IO and estimated average price data. As we can see, 
the combusted quantities derived using IO table are not proportional to the quantities from 
MECS. 
We regard the quantities from MECS and the USDA as the best estimates and thus 
assume that these industries paid different average prices. For the other industries we have to 
assume a common price. This common price is derived by first subtracting the quantity used in 
the manufacturing group and agriculture from the national total. The value of consumption 
outside of these two groups is then divided by this residual quantity to give the common price. 
The use of coal, oil, and gas for each industry outside of manufacturing and agriculture is then 
the Use table value divided by the common price. In the following sections we discuss how we 
derive the total consumption and combusted quantity of various fuels. 
A.2.2 Coal 
We obtained the national quantity of coal (1,066.4 million short tons) consumed in the 
United States in 2002 as well as the quantity of coal consumed by the electric power sector 
(977.5 million short tons) from the AER (2006).16 We also obtained the quantity of coal 
consumed by the manufacturing sector from MECS. We then used the IO value to estimate the 
quantities of coal consumption for nonmanufacturing sectors. We divided the intermediate value 
                                                 
15 The MECS for 2002 was downloaded from 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/mecs/mecs2002/data02/shelltables.html. 
16 AER (2006); Table 7.3 gives the data for coal. Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
 
  61
by the intermediate quantity to give the intermediate implicit price. We used this price along with 
the quantity of coal to update the IO values. Total coal consumption and combusted coal are 
displayed in Table A4. 
A.2.3 Oil 
For 2002, total U.S. domestic crude oil consumption is 5,433 million barrels, which 
includes 2,097 million barrels17 from domestic production and 3,336 million barrels18 from 
imports. The petroleum industry consumes more than 99.9 percent (5,427 million barrels) of 
domestic consumption. However, most of the crude oil is consumed as feedstock to produce 
petroleum products. According to our estimate made by using MECS data, only about 365 
million barrels (6.7%) are combusted. The balance (93.3 percent) is used as feedstock. The total 
consumption and combusted crude oil are listed in Table A5.     
A.2.4 Petroleum 
For 2002, total domestic consumption of petroleum is about 7,177 million barrels, which 
include 6,305 million barrels of domestic refinery production and 872 million barrels of refinery 
imports. The farm sector consumes about 130.1 million barrels of petroleum.19 Electricity 
utilities consume about 99.2 million barrels of petroleum.20 We also obtained the petroleum 
consumption of manufacturing sectors by using MECS data. We then estimated petroleum 
consumption for other nonmanufacturing sectors by using the petroleum implicit price derived 
from the IO values and petroleum quantities. 
The total consumption and combusted petroleum–LPG and petroleum–others are listed in 
Tables A6 and A7, respectively.  
A.2.5 Natural Gas 
The sources of domestic natural gas consumption in the IO table include natural gas 
mining and gas utility. The total amount of U.S. domestic natural gas consumption in 2002 is 
about 23,007 billion cubic feet.21 We first estimated natural gas consumption from natural gas 
                                                 
17 AER (2006); Table 5.1 gives the data for crude oil domestic production. 
18 AER (2006); Table 5.3 gives the data for crude oil imports. 
19 James Duffield, Economic Research Service, USDA. 
20 EIA Electric Power Annual (2006); http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epat4p1.html. 
21 AER (2006); Table 6.1 gives the data of natural gas consumption. Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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mining. Electric utilities consume about 5,672 billion cubic feet of natural gas (assumed to be 
from gas mining).22 We used total domestic and electric utility consumption quantities (noted 
above) as well as natural gas mining consumption value data from the IO table to estimate 
natural gas consumption quantity data for all industrial sectors (electric utility). On the basis of 
this procedure, we estimate that gas utility purchased about 14,996 billion cubic feet of natural 
gas from gas mining. We know that the farm sector consumes about 58 billion cubic feet of 
natural gas.23 For the manufacturing sector, we know the amount of natural gas consumed from 
gas utilities by subtracting natural gas consumption (from natural gas mining) from total natural 
gas consumption (obtained from MECS). Using these quantities and the value of gas utility 
consumption information from the IO table, we estimate the amount of natural gas consumption 
for other nonmanufacturing sectors. We then recalculate the IO values for natural gas mining and 
gas utility by using their respective intermediate implicit prices. The total consumption and 
combusted natural gas are listed in Table A8.  
A.2.6 Electricity 
MECS (2002, Table 1.1) also gives the quantity of electricity consumed by each of the 
manufacturing industries. This is reproduced in Table A3a. There are no equivalent surveys for 
nonmanufacturing industries that we are aware of. The National Agriculture Statistics Service 
collects data on energy expenses and prices at the regional level. The detailed data are not 
published, but a summary is given in the Farm Production Expenditures Annual Summary.24 
James Duffield of the Economic Research Service used these data together with electricity price 
data from other sources to make an unofficial estimate of Agriculture carbon emissions and 
kindly shared his calculations with us. From his estimates we obtain the electricity consumption 
given in Table A9. 
We first compare this estimate of electricity consumption from MECS to the one in the 
2002 IO table. Since neither source is based on a full census, the degree of consistency between 
these two sources would give us an idea of their reliability. To derive the quantities from the IO 
data we first need prices. 
                                                 
22 AER (2006); Table 6.5. 
23 James Duffield, Economic Research Service, USDA. 
24 The Farm Production Expenditures Annual Summary is available at 
http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/MannUsda/viewDocumentInfo.do?documentID=1066. Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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AER25 gives the total national consumption in 2002 at 3,632 billion kWh. Applying this 
figure to the IO table value of electricity and electricity consumption by manufacturing 
industries, we estimate electricity consumption for other nonmanufacturing sectors. We then use 
a common price to rescale the electricity consumption IO values.  
A.3  CO2 Emissions and Intensity 
We estimate CO2 emissions in the United States at 5,752 million metric tons, representing 
about 85 percent of total U.S. GHG emissions. Most CO2 is emitted as a result of the combustion 
of fossil fuels and is highly correlated with energy use. In this research we consider primary CO2 
emissions from coal, oil, petroleum, and natural gas. We also consider total CO2 emissions, 
which include primary emissions plus emissions due to electricity consumption for individual 
sectors. Table A10 shows our estimates of total CO2 emissions, CO2 emissions from direct 
combustion of primary fuels, and CO2 emissions due to electricity consumptions for individual 
sectors. Table A11 shows total and primary CO2 emissions intensities; data are derived from 
dividing emissions by industrial output. 
Appendix A. Tables 












Farms 177,337  171,482  168,532 
Forestry, fishing, etc.   34,382  41,502  48,460 
Oil mining  61,093  51,295  126,146 
Gas mining  41,144  35,996  52,569 
Coal mining  19,269  19,172  18,881 
Other mining activities  57,139  57,729  56,813 
Electric utilities (including 
government enterprises) 259,603  250,078  250,852 
Gas utilities  82,614  92,965  92,926 
Construction 966,919  1,031,693  1,031,627 
Food 470,396  474,835  486,680 
Textile 59,670  53,357  62,447 
                                                 
25 EIA (2005); Table 8.1. Available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/aer/. Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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Apparel 44,078  41,737  133,149 
Wood and furniture  136,132  133,874  164,005 
Pulp mills                                               3,443  5,197  5,177 
Paper mills                                              45,319  45,945  52,514 
Paperboard mills                                     21,095  19,847  19,882 
Other papers  173,273  145,200  145,197 
Refining–LPG 21,023  15,558  15,558 
Refining–other 169,836  177,511  191,641 
Petrochemical mfg.                                14,743  18,531  18,270 
Other basic inorganic chemical mfg.      15,177  17,270  17,745 
Other basic organic chemical mfg.         47,573  49,531  47,725 
Plastics material and resin mfg.      44,832  44,611  38,808 
Artificial and synthetic fibers, 
filaments                                7,651  12,359  12,508 
Fertilizer manufacturing                         8,239  8,575  9,195 
Other chemical and plastics  403,058  398,920  448,400 
Glass container manufacturing               4,367  4,361  4,861 
Cement manufacturing                           7,058  7,022  8,132 
Lime and gypsum product mfg.             4,900  4,818  4,837 
Mineral wool manufacturing                  4,834  4,810  4,787 
Other nonmetallic mineral 67,020  65,907  74,686 
Iron and steel mills, ferroalloy mfg.       41,942  52,665  62,903 
Alumina refining, primary aluminum    18,765  18,104  22,262 
Ferrous metal foundries                          14,700  14,413  14,545 
Nonferrous metal foundries                    11,420  11,158  11,142 
Other primary metals  28,403  21,628  29,823 
Fabricated metals  219,291  212,025  225,327 
Machinery 221,635  221,818  228,125 
Computer and electrical equipment  363,578  352,482  466,241 
Motor vehicles  326,173  323,386  450,146 
Other transportation equipment  134,524  131,718  105,557 
Miscellaneous manufacturing  115,134  112,248  158,471 
Trade 1,850,478  1,733,304  1,645,222 
Air transportation  99,315  102,362  102,147 
Truck transportation  194,732  200,162  187,881 
Other transportation  329,317  331,215  297,242 
Information 824,047  648,073  625,365 
Finance and insurance  1,138,654  1,083,077  1,074,983 
Real estate and rental  1,931,963  1,997,938  1,953,017 
Business services  1,710,859 1,975,840 1,927,957 
Other services  2,370,176  2,728,059  2,729,030 
Government excluding electricity  2,043,064  1,682,805  1,682,805 
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Farms 0  0  3  2,696  312  0  3,950 
Forestry, fishing, etc.  0  0  0  61  8  0  595 
Oil mining  0  0  2  813  386  0  288 
Gas mining  0  0  1  548  260  0  194 
Coal mining  0  0  0  379  195  0  171 
Other mining activities  0  1  3  1,376  812  0  740 
Electric utilities (including 
government enterprises)  0  13,536 17,752  0  26  0  3,011 
Gas utilities  0  35,789  0  28  0  0  72 
Construction 0  0  0  2,934  665  0  22,053 
Food 0  6  165  4,932  3,282  28  700 
Textile 0  2  18  1,978  539  12  117 
Apparel 0  0  0  282  108  1  11 
Wood and furniture  0  6  0  1,840  416  29  72 
Pulp mills                                          0  0  5  104  123  0  70 
Paper mills                                         0  2  240  2,231  1,159  7  269 
Paperboard mills                               0  2  69  1,074  981  2  185 
Other papers  0  1  3  1,855  606  25  32 
Refining–LPG 13,880  0  25  269  507  0  0 
Refining–other 112,126 0  203  2,171  4,093  118  0 
Petrochemical mfg.                           51  131  20  783  802  4,707  369 
Other basic inorganic chemical 
mfg.                                          5  134  15  1,700  98  55  103 
Other basic organic chemical mfg.    49  471  130  1,806  2,400  3,693  2,108 
Plastics material and resin mfg.      32  99  22  1,218  1,645  6,553  252 
Artificial and synthetic fibers, 
filaments                                0  16  8  193  270  0  27 
Fertilizer manufacturing                    0  38  0  297  2,612  0  21 
Other chemical and plastics  3  231  64  7,215  2,241  217  1,088 
Glass container manufacturing          0  0  0  258  275  1  0 
Cement manufacturing                      0  0  193  818  113  0  530 
Lime and gypsum product mfg.        0  0  54  89  38  0  144 
Mineral wool manufacturing             0  0  0  246  189  1  8 
Other nonmetallic mineral  0 1 6  1,305  1,597  13 224 
Iron and steel mills, ferroalloy 
mfg.                                         0  1  345  3,771  2,222  1  188 
Alumina refining, primary 
aluminum                                          0  3  0  3,719  704  3  754 
Ferrous metal foundries                    0  0  3  539  145  7  17 
Nonferrous metal foundries              0  0  0  213  162  1  0 
Other primary metals  0  0  10  1,240  452  14  71 
Fabricated metals  0  2  0  3,092  1,094  18  45 
Machinery 0  3  1  1,612  424  22  32 Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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Computer and electrical 
equipment 0  0  0  3,429  625  8  395 
Motor vehicles  0  3  0  2,380  825  20  143 
Other transportation equipment  0  1  0  934  232  0  69 
Miscellaneous manufacturing  0  1  0  681  165  3  14 
Trade 0  147  0  15,278  1,552  0  4,795 
Air transportation  0  0  0  76  4  0  10,248 
Truck transportation  0  0  0  551  124  0  11,764 
Other  transportation  0 1,156 0 2,161  806  0  11,112 
Information 0  97  0  2,774  1,262  0  1068 
Finance and insurance  0  7  0  1,713  229  0  485 
Real estate and rental  0  33  1  14,586  852  0  1,956 
Business services  0  186  1  6,567  1,238  0  11,618 
Other services  0  292  1  26,481  5,156  0  3,498 
Government excluding electricity  0  2,504  3  10,453  9,408  0  30,002 
C 0  0  14  107,106  38,490  0  68,191 
I 0  –2,338  –498  0  0  0  –2,228 
G 0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
X 626  853  938  427  39  0  9,430 
M –75,477 –17,426  –647  –1,201  0  0  –23,560 
Total commodity  51,295  35,996  19,172  250,078  92,965  15,558  177,511 
Total domestic consumption  126,146 52,569  18,881  250,852  92,926  15,558  191,641 
 
 






















Food 9,066  2,399  3,430  605  1,568  75,160 
Textile 1,005  925  342  100  662  30,146 
Apparel 0  71  291  20  34  4,304 
Wood and furniture  0  155  1,811  80  1,583  28,047 
Pulp mills                                  279  1,490  806  23  26  1,579 
Paper mills                                13,207  8,164  704  216  389  34,005 
Paperboard mills                       3,759  5,392  661  183  128  16,369 
Other papers  167  891  167  113  1,370  28,264 
Petroleum 569  3,995  2,821  854  6,106  37,186 
Petrochemical mfg.                   1,115  506  41  167  695  11,938 
Other basic inorganic 
chemical mfg.                           851 304  351  67  46 25,904 
Other basic organic chemical 
mfg.                                           7,135  2,108  341  479  4,354  27,521 
Plastics material and resin 
mfg.      1,198  87  251  339  125  21,495 Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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Artificial and synthetic 
fibers, filaments                        463  11  27  29  23  4,956 
Fertilizer manufacturing           33  182  165  202  4  4,521 
Other chemical and plastics  3,507  4,464  1,569  476  4,477  109,950 
Glass container 
manufacturing                           0 0 13  51  52  3,932 
Cement manufacturing             10,633  106  967  21  17  12,471 
Lime and gypsum product 
mfg.                                           2,958  46  210  7  8  1,353 
Mineral wool manufacturing    0  0  260  34  47  3,750 
Other nonmetallic mineral 336  307  3,916  297  705  19,887 
Iron and steel mills, 
ferroalloy mfg.                          1,824  96  1,776  384  39  57,470 
Alumina refining, primary 
aluminum                                  0  0  203  127  145  56,673 
Ferrous metal foundries            49  0  87  27  105  8,211 
Nonferrous metal foundries      0  0  12  30  82  3,247 
Other primary metals  323  46  482  84  438  18,901 
Fabricated metals  35  0  959  204  965  47,123 
Machinery 51  7  371  80  664  24,563 
Computer and electrical 
equipment 20  159  279  114  419  52,253 
Motor vehicles  0  990  552  197  1,090  50,508 
Other transportation 
equipment 0  0  0  0  0  0 
Miscellaneous 
manufacturing 0  36  71  31  183  10,374 
Total Manufacturing  58,583  26,679  12,209  3,477  17,113  35,1395 
Note: These are numbers for the combusted fuels, not all-purpose or consumed fuels.  
 













(billion cu. ft.) 
Food 17,539  0  0  27,065  858 
Textile 1655  0  0  2,226  109 
Apparel 91  0  0  725  68 
Wood and furniture  223  0  0  8,658  110 
Pulp mills                                          908  0  0  766  31 
Paper mills                                        7,369  0  0  10,631  256 
Paperboard mills                               5,924  4  0  5,077  206 
Other papers  1,849  0  0  11,834  123 
Petroleum 6,153  424,000  4,252  0  783 
Petrochemical mfg.                           1,113  282  0  19,145  193 
Other basic inorganic chemical  320  288  0  2,322  56 Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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mfg.                                         
Other basic organic chemical 
mfg.                                               2,123  1,011  0  18,733  373 
Plastics material and resin mfg.      850  213  0  1,451  101 
Artificial and synthetic fibers, 
filaments                                143 35  0  7,683 19 
Fertilizer manufacturing                   337  82  0  11,129  129 
Other chemical and plastics  3,071  497  0  78,201  350 
Glass container manufacturing         1,741  0  0  804  39 
Cement manufacturing                      3,870  0  0  1,275  86 
Lime and gypsum product mfg.        2,957  0  0  948  66 
Mineral wool manufacturing            1,199  0  0  463  26 
Other nonmetallic mineral 8,293  0  0  3,961  184 
Iron and steel mills, ferroalloy 
mfg.                                         73,936  0  0  1,982  232 
Alumina refining, primary 
aluminum                                          3,938  0  0  835  85 
Ferrous metal foundries                    1,513  0  0  206  34 
Nonferrous metal foundries              1,107  0  0  333  25 
Other primary metals  2,352  0  0  3,749  53 
Fabricated metals  143  0  0  10,391  246 
Machinery 205  0  0  11,812  92 
Computer and electrical 
equipment  103 0  0  14,865  138 
Motor vehicles  479  0  0  3,757  191 
Other transportation equipment  143  0  0  1,545  54 
Miscellaneous manufacturing  0  0  0  3,369  39 
Total manufacturing  46,597  425,914  4,252  127,445  3,415 
 
Table A4. Total Consumption and Combusted Fuel: Coal (million short tons) 
 
Sector Total  consumption  Combusted 
Farms 0.1  0.1 
Forestry, fishing, etc.  0.0  0.0 
Oil mining  0.1  0.1 
Gas mining  0.1  0.1 
Coal mining  0.0  0.0 
Other mining activities  0.2  0.2 
Electric utilities (including 
government enterprises)  977.5  977.5 
Gas utilities  0.0  0.0 
Construction 0.0  0.0 
Food 9.1  9.1 
Textile 1.0  1.0 
Apparel 0.0  0.0 Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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Wood and furniture  0.0  0.0 
Pulp mills                                               0.3  0.3 
Paper mills                                             13.2  13.2 
Paperboard mills                                    3.8  3.8 
Other papers  0.2  0.2 
Refining–LPG 1.0  1.0 
Refining–other 11.6  11.6 
Petrochemical mfg.                               1.1  1.1 
Other basic inorganic chemical mfg.     0.9  0.9 
Other basic organic chemical mfg.        7.1  7.1 
Plastics material and resin mfg.      1.2  1.2 
Artificial and synthetic fibers, 
filaments                                0.5  0.5 
Fertilizer manufacturing                        0.0  0.0 
Other chemical and plastics  3.5  3.5 
Glass container manufacturing              0.0  0.0 
Cement manufacturing                           10.6  10.6 
Lime and gypsum product mfg.             3.0  3.0 
Mineral wool manufacturing                 0.0  0.0 
Other nonmetallic mineral  0.3  0.3 
Iron and steel mills, ferroalloy mfg.      19.0  19.0 
Alumina refining, primary aluminum    0.0  0.0 
Ferrous metal foundries                         0.2  0.2 
Nonferrous metal foundries                   0.0  0.0 
Other primary metals  0.6  0.6 
Fabricated metals  0.0  0.0 
Machinery 0.1  0.1 
Computer and electrical equipment  0.0  0.0 
Motor vehicles  0.0  0.0 
Other transportation equipment  0.0  0.0 
Miscellaneous manufacturing  0.0  0.0 
Trade 0.0  0.0 
Air transportation  0.0  0.0 
Truck transportation  0.0  0.0 
Other transportation  0.0  0.0 
Information 0.0  0.0 
Finance and insurance  0.0  0.0 
Real estate and rental  0.1  0.1 
Business services  0.1  0.1 
Other services  0.0  0.0 
Government excluding electricity  0.1  0.1 
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Sector Total  consumption  Combusted 
Farms 0.0  0.0 
Forestry, fishing, etc.  0.0  0.0 
Oil mining  0.0  0.0 
Gas mining  0.0  0.0 
Coal mining  0.0  0.0 
Other mining activities  0.0  0.0 
Electric utilities (including 
government enterprises)  0.0  0.0 
Gas utilities  0.0  0.0 
Construction 0.0  0.0 
Food 0.0  0.0 
Textile 0.0  0.0 
Apparel 0.0  0.0 
Wood and furniture  0.0  0.0 
Pulp mills                                                 0.0  0.0 
Paper mills                                               0.0  0.0 
Paperboard mills                                      0.0  0.0 
Other papers  0.0  0.0 
Refining–LPG 597.9  40.2 
Refining–other 4,829.4  325.1 
Petrochemical mfg.                                  2.2  2.2 
Other basic inorganic chemical mfg.       0.2  0.2 
Other basic organic chemical mfg.          2.1  2.1 
Plastics material and resin mfg.      1.4  1.4 
Artificial and synthetic fibers, 
filaments                                0.0  0.0 
Fertilizer manufacturing                          0.0  0.0 
Other chemical and plastics  0.1  0.1 
Glass container manufacturing                0.0  0.0 
Cement manufacturing                             0.0  0.0 
Lime and gypsum product mfg.               0.0  0.0 
Mineral wool manufacturing                   0.0  0.0 
Other nonmetallic mineral  0.0  0.0 
Iron and steel mills, ferroalloy mfg.        0.0  0.0 
Alumina refining, primary aluminum      0.0  0.0 
Ferrous metal foundries                           0.0  0.0 
Nonferrous metal foundries                     0.0  0.0 
Other primary metals  0.0  0.0 
Fabricated metals  0.0  0.0 
Machinery 0.0  0.0 
Computer and electrical equipment  0.0  0.0 








Table A6. Total Consumption and Combusted Fuel: Refining–LPG 
(million bbl) 
Sector Total  consumption  Combusted 
Farms 0.0  0.0 
Forestry, fishing, etc.   0.0  0.0 
Oil mining  0.0  0.0 
Gas mining  0.0  0.0 
Coal mining  0.0  0.0 
Other mining activities  0.0  0.0 
Electric utilities (including 
government enterprises)  0.0 0.0 
Gas utilities  0.0  0.0 
Construction 0.0  0.0 
Food 1.6  1.4 
Textile 0.7  0.6 
Apparel 0.0  0.0 
Wood and furniture  1.6  1.5 
Pulp mills                                                 0.0  0.0 
Paper mills                                               0.4  0.4 
Paperboard mills                                      0.1  0.1 
Other papers  1.4  1.3 
Refining–LPG 0.0  0.0 
Refining–other 6.5  6.0 
Petrochemical mfg.                                  260.0  156.5 
Other basic inorganic chemical mfg.       3.0  0.8 
Other basic organic chemical mfg.          204.0  32.2 
Plastics material and resin mfg.      362.0  10.0 
Artificial and synthetic fibers, 
filaments                                0.0  0.0 
Other transportation equipment  0.0  0.0 
Miscellaneous manufacturing  0.0  0.0 
Trade 0.0  0.0 
Air transportation  0.0  0.0 
Truck transportation  0.0  0.0 
Other transportation  0.0  0.0 
Information 0.0  0.0 
Finance and insurance  0.0  0.0 
Real estate and rental  0.0  0.0 
Business services  0.0  0.0 
Other services  0.0  0.0 
Government excluding electricity  0.0  0.0 Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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Fertilizer manufacturing                          0.0  0.0 
Other chemical and plastics  12.0  5.1 
Glass container manufacturing                0.1  0.0 
Cement manufacturing                            0.0  0.0 
Lime and gypsum product mfg.              0.0  0.0 
Mineral wool manufacturing                   0.0  0.0 
Other nonmetallic mineral  0.7  0.6 
Iron and steel mills, ferroalloy mfg.        0.0  0.0 
Alumina refining, primary aluminum     0.1  0.1 
Ferrous metal foundries                           0.4  0.2 
Nonferrous metal foundries                     0.1  0.1 
Other primary metals  0.8  0.7 
Fabricated metals  1.0  0.9 
Machinery 1.2  1.1 
Computer and electrical equipment  0.4  0.4 
Motor vehicles  1.1  0.9 
Other transportation equipment  0.0  0.0 
Miscellaneous manufacturing  0.2  0.2 
Trade 0.0  0.0 
Air transportation  0.0  0.0 
Truck transportation  0.0  0.0 
Other transportation  0.0  0.0 
Information 0.0  0.0 
Finance and insurance  0.0  0.0 
Real estate and rental  0.0  0.0 
Business services  0.0  0.0 
Other services  0.0  0.0 
Government excluding electricity  0.0  0.0 
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Table A7. Total Consumption and Combusted Fuel: Refining–Others (million bbl) 
Sector Total  consumption  Combusted 
Farms 130.1  119.9 
Forestry, fishing, etc.   19.6  18.1 
Oil mining  9.5  8.7 
Gas mining  6.4  5.9 
Coal mining  5.6  5.2 
Other mining activities  24.4  22.4 
Electric utilities (including 
government enterprises)  99.2  91.4 
Gas utilities  2.4  2.2 
Construction 726.6  669.2 
Food 23.1  21.2 
Textile 3.9  3.5 
Apparel 0.4  0.3 
Wood and furniture  2.4  2.2 
Pulp mills                                               2.3  2.1 
Paper mills                                              8.9  8.2 
Paperboard mills                                    6.1  5.6 
Other papers  1.1  1.0 
Refining–LPG 0.0  0.0 
Refining–other 0.0  0.0 
Petrochemical mfg.                                12.1  7.3 
Other basic inorganic chemical mfg.     3.4  0.9 
Other basic organic chemical mfg.        69.5  11.0 
Plastics material and resin mfg.      8.3  0.2 
Artificial and synthetic fibers, 
filaments                                0.9  0.8 
Fertilizer manufacturing                         0.7  0.6 
Other chemical and plastics  35.8  15.4 
Glass container manufacturing               0.0  0.0 
Cement manufacturing                           17.5  16.1 
Lime and gypsum product mfg.             4.7  4.4 
Mineral wool manufacturing                  0.3  0.2 
Other nonmetallic mineral  7.4  6.8 
Iron and steel mills, ferroalloy mfg.       6.2  1.9 
Alumina refining, primary aluminum    24.9  22.9 
Ferrous metal foundries                         0.6  0.3 
Nonferrous metal foundries                   0.0  0.0 










Table A8. Total Consumption and Combusted Fuel: Natural Gas 
(billion cu. ft.) 
Sector Total  consumption  Combusted 
Farms 58.0  58.0 
Forestry, fishing, etc.   1.4  1.4 
Oil mining  71.7  71.7 
Gas mining  48.3  48.3 
Coal mining  36.3  36.3 
Other mining activities  151.1  151.1 
Electric utilities (including 
government enterprises)  5,676.8  5,676.8 
Gas utilities  0.0  0.0 
Construction 123.4  123.4 
Food 612.0  605.0 
Textile 101.0  100.0 
Apparel 20.0  20.0 
Wood and furniture  80.0  80.0 
Pulp mills                                               23.0  23.0 
Paper mills                                             216.0  216.0 
Paperboard mills                                    183.0  183.0 
Other papers  113.0  113.0 
Refining–LPG 94.1  94.1 
Refining–other 759.9  759.9 
Petrochemical mfg.                                204.0  168.0 
Fabricated metals  1.5  1.4 
Machinery 1.1  1.0 
Computer and electrical equipment  13.0  12.0 
Motor vehicles  4.7  3.8 
Other transportation equipment  2.3  2.1 
Miscellaneous manufacturing  0.5  0.4 
Trade 158.0  145.5 
Air transportation  337.7  311.0 
Truck transportation  387.6  357.0 
Other transportation  366.1  337.2 
Information 35.2  32.4 
Finance and insurance  16.0  14.7 
Real estate and rental  64.4  59.3 
Business services  382.8  352.6 
Other services  115.3  106.1 
Government excluding electricity  988.5  910.4 Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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Other basic inorganic chemical mfg.     74.5  66.5 
Other basic organic chemical mfg.        643.0  479.0 
Plastics material and resin mfg.      347.0  291.2 
Artificial and synthetic fibers, 
filaments                                57.0  55.2 
Fertilizer manufacturing                         501.0  203.0 
Other chemical and plastics  513.0  473.0 
Glass container manufacturing              51.0  51.0 
Cement manufacturing                           21.0  21.0 
Lime and gypsum product mfg.             7.0  7.0 
Mineral wool manufacturing                  35.0  34.0 
Other nonmetallic mineral  297.0  297.0 
Iron and steel mills, ferroalloy mfg.       413.0  383.5 
Alumina refining, primary aluminum    132.0  127.0 
Ferrous metal foundries                         27.0  26.9 
Nonferrous metal foundries                   30.0  30.0 
Other primary metals  84.0  84.0 
Fabricated metals  204.0  204.0 
Machinery 80.0  80.0 
Computer and electrical equipment  116.0  114.0 
Motor vehicles  154.5  154.1 
Other transportation equipment  43.5  43.5 
Miscellaneous manufacturing  31.0  31.0 
Trade 349.7  349.7 
Air transportation  0.8  0.8 
Truck transportation  23.0  23.0 
Other transportation  634.0  634.0 
Information 275.0  275.0 
Finance and insurance  45.5  45.5 
Real estate and rental  172.2  172.2 
Business services  307.7  307.7 
Other services  1,079.7  1,079.7 
Government excluding electricity  2,795.9  2,795.9 
 






Forestry, fishing, etc.  926 
Oil mining  12,391 
Gas mining  8,345 
Coal mining  5,774 
Other mining activities  20,975 
Electric utilities (including government 
enterprises)  0 Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
 
  76





Wood and furniture  28,047 
Pulp mills                                                    1,579 
Paper mills                                                  34,005 
Paperboard mills                                         16,369 
Other papers  28,264 
Refining–LPG 4,096 
Refining–other 33,090 
Petrochemical mfg.                                     11,938 
Other basic inorganic chemical mfg.          25,904 
Other basic organic chemical mfg.             27,521 
Plastics material and resin mfg.      18,559 
Artificial and synthetic fibers, filaments     2,936 
Fertilizer manufacturing                              4,521 
Other chemical and plastics  109,950 
Glass container manufacturing                   3,932 
Cement manufacturing                                12,471 
Lime and gypsum product mfg.                  1,353 
Mineral wool manufacturing                       3,750 
Other nonmetallic mineral  19,887 
Iron and steel mills, ferroalloy mfg.            57,470 
Alumina refining, primary aluminum         56,673 
Ferrous metal foundries                              8,211 
Nonferrous metal foundries                        3,247 
Other primary metals  18,901 
Fabricated metals  47,123 
Machinery 24,563 
Computer and electrical equipment  52,253 
Motor vehicles  36,269 
Other transportation equipment  14,239 
Miscellaneous manufacturing  10,374 
Trade 232,839 
Air transportation  1,157 
Truck transportation  8,390 
Other transportation  32,927 
Information 42,277 
Finance and insurance  26,102 
Real estate and rental  222,291 
Business services  100,087 
Other services  403,573 
Government excluding electricity  159,306 
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Farms 76,342,617  51,021,942  25,320,676 
Forestry, fishing, etc.  7,818,166  7,247,670  570,496 
Oil mining  15,199,727  7,562,082  7,637,645 
Gas mining  10,236,725  5,092,918  5,143,807 
Coal mining  7,605,875  4,046,747  3,559,127 
Other mining activities  30,464,207  17,535,745  12,928,461 
Electric utilities (including 
government enterprises)  2,244,924,377 2,244,924,377 0 
Gas utilities  1,129,501  864,717  264,784 
Construction 299,969,872  272,405,637  27,564,235 
Food 105,811,684  59,484,956  46,326,728 
Textile 27,560,253  8,979,019 18,581,234 
Apparel 3,886,867  1,233,990  2,652,877 
Wood and furniture  22,887,813  5,600,349  17,287,463 
Pulp mills                                                 3,617,342  2,644,086  973,256 
Paper mills                                              61,749,898  40,790,074 20,959,824 
Paperboard mills                                      29,733,835 19,644,396 10,089,439 
Other papers  24,620,526  7,199,310  17,421,217 
Refining–LPG 26,924,219  24,399,365  2,524,853 
Refining–other 225,505,256  205,109,597  20,395,659 
Petrochemical mfg.                                  60,723,541  53,365,278  7,358,263 
Other basic inorganic chemical mfg.       21,917,603  5,951,031  15,966,572 
Other basic organic chemical mfg.          70,150,790  53,187,334  16,963,456 
Plastics material and resin mfg.      32,794,581  21,355,304  11,439,277 
Artificial and synthetic fibers, 
filaments                                6,060,475  4,250,776  1,809,699 
Fertilizer manufacturing                          14,144,832 11,358,202 2,786,630 
Other chemical and plastics  107,856,621  40,086,323  67,770,298 
Glass container manufacturing                5,229,726  2,806,140 2,423,586 
Cement manufacturing                            35,867,253  28,180,443  7,686,810 
Lime and gypsum product mfg.               8,695,133  7,861,178  833,955 
Mineral wool manufacturing                   4,276,876  1,965,471  2,311,405 
Other nonmetallic mineral  32,017,530 19,759,685 12,257,845 
Iron and steel mills, ferroalloy mfg.        94,066,181  58,643,123  35,423,058 
Alumina refining, pri aluminum              50,999,622  16,067,814  34,931,808 
Ferrous metal foundries                           7,013,271  1,952,218  5,061,053 
Nonferrous metal foundries                     3,665,182  1,663,813  2,001,369 
Other primary metals  18,339,751  6,689,651  11,650,100 
Fabricated metals  40,968,644  11,923,216  29,045,429 
Machinery 20,275,004  5,134,991  15,140,014 
Computer and electrical equipment  43,299,123  11,091,692  32,207,431 
Motor vehicles  32,511,385  10,156,205  22,355,181 
Other transportation equipment  11,994,983  3,218,306  8,776,676 
Miscellaneous manufacturing  8,296,281  1,902,009  6,394,272 Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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Trade 220,432,836  76,916,723  143,516,113 
Air transportation  124,208,958  123,495,630  713,329 
Truck transportation  148,141,226  142,970,008  5,171,218 
Other transportation  188,861,573  168,565,943  20,295,630 
Information 53,973,358  27,915,133  26,058,225 
Finance and insurance  24,419,924  8,331,599  16,088,325 
Real estate and rental  170,098,400  33,084,106  137,014,294 
Business services  218,603,298 156,912,035  61,691,264 
Other services  350,013,486  101,261,300  248,752,185 
Government excluding electricity  612,819,746  514,627,589  98,192,158 
 







Farms 430.5  287.7 
Forestry, fishing etc  227.4  210.8 
Oil mining  248.8  123.8 
Gas mining  248.8  123.8 
Coal mining  394.8  210.0 
Other mining activities  533.1  306.9 
Electric utilities (including 
government enterprises)  8,647.6  8,647.6 
Gas utilities  13.7  10.5 
Construction 310.2  281.7 
Food 224.9  126.5 
Textile 461.9  150.5 
Apparel 88.2  28.0 
Wood and furniture  168.1  41.1 
Pulp mills                                              1,050.2  767.7 
Paper mills                                            1,362.5  900.0 
Paperboard mills                                   1,409.4  931.2 
Other papers  142.1  41.5 
Refining–LPG 1,280.6  1,160.5 
Refining–other 1,327.8  1,207.7 
Petrochemical mfg.                               4,118.3  3,619.3 
Other basic inorganic chemical mfg.    1,444.1  392.1 
Other basic organic chemical mfg.       1,474.5  1,118.0 
Plastics material and resin mfg.      731.5  476.3 
Artificial and synthetic fibers, 
filaments                                792.0  555.5 
Fertilizer manufacturing                       1,716.6  1,378.5 
Other chemical and plastics  267.6  99.5 
Glass container manufacturing             1,197.3  642.5 
Cement manufacturing                         5,080.7  3,991.8 Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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Lime and gypsum product mfg.           1,775.0  1,604.7 
Mineral wool manufacturing                884.6  406.5 
Other nonmetallic mineral  477.7  294.8 
Iron and steel mills, ferroalloy mfg.     2,242.7  1,398.1 
Alumina refining, primary 
aluminum                                            2,717.7  856.2 
Ferrous metal foundries                        477.1  132.8 
Nonferrous metal foundries                  321.0  145.7 
Other primary metals  645.7  235.5 
Fabricated metals  186.8  54.4 
Machinery 91.5  23.2 
Computer and electrical equipment  119.1  30.5 
Motor vehicles  99.7  31.1 
Other transportation equipment  89.2  23.9 
Miscellaneous manufacturing  72.1  16.5 
Trade 119.1  41.6 
Air transportation  1,250.7  1,243.5 
Truck transportation  760.7  734.2 
Other transportation  573.5  511.9 
Information 65.5  33.9 
Finance and insurance  21.4  7.3 
Real estate and rental  88.0  17.1 
Business services  127.8  91.7 
Other services  147.7  42.7 
Government excluding electricity  300.0  251.9 
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Appendix B. Adkins–Garbaccio CGE Model 
In this Appendix we describe the multisector, multiregion model that is used to simulate 
the effects of the medium-run and long-run horizons. It is also used to generate the demand 
elasticities for industry output,  j η . The model is described in detail in Adkins and Garbaccio 
(2007) and Adkins (2006), and we only discuss the main features here. 
The model is based on the GTAP (v6) database and is aggregated to three world regions: 
the United States, the rest of Annex I, and the rest of the world (Table B1). The rest of Annex I 
comprises the other developed countries that essentially have had a very different pattern of 
exports and imports with the U.S. compared with the rest of the world. In particular, the rest of 
the world exports oil to the United States. 
GTAP identifies 52 industries, many of which are in the agriculture group. These are 
aggregated to 21 industries as shown in Table B2. 
The model is a one-period (long-run) model where the labor supply is elastic. The 
production functions are CES nested functions; at the top tier the value-added energy bundle is 
substitutable with all other intermediate inputs. The second tier is a CES function of the value-
added bundle and the energy bundle. Value added is a CES function of capital, labor, and land. 
The energy bundle is a function of coal mining, gas, petroleum products, and electricity. The 
main equations of the model are listed in Table B3, with the variable description given in Table 
B4. The elasticities of substitution are given in Table B5.  
Appendix B. Tables 
 Table B1. Regions in Model 
 
Abbreviation Region 
USA United  States 
AN1  Australia Austria Belarus Belgium Bulgaria Canada Croatia 
  Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany 
  Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Japan Latvia  
  Lithuania Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway 
  Poland Portugal Romania Russia Slovakia Slovenia Spain 
  Sweden Switzerland Turkey Ukraine United Kingdom  




Table B2. Sectors in Model 
Abbreviation No.  Sector 
    
AGR 1  Agriculture 
COA 2  Coal 
OIL 3  Oil  mining 
GAS 4  Natural  gas 
OMN 5  Other  minerals 
FBT  6  Food, beverages, and tobacco 
TEX 7  Textiles 
WAP  8  Wearing apparel and leather goods 
LUM  9  Wood and paper products 
PCP  10  Petroleum and coal products 
CRP  11  Chemicals, rubber, and plastics 
NMM  12  Other nonmetallic mineral products 
MET  13  Ferrous and nonferrous metals 
FMP 14  Fabricated  metal  products 
MVH  15  Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 
ELE 16  Electronic  goods 
OME  17  Other machinery, equipment, and manufactures 
ELY 18  Electricity 
CNS 19  Construction 
TRN 20  Transportation  services 
SER 21  Services 
 
Table B3. Equation for Producer Model 
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ζ    value-added energy bundle     (13) 
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ζ                         total interim input     (16) 
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Table B4. Model Variable Listing 
PWEt,s,r  World price (seller price FOB) 
PEt,r  Exported goods price 
PWMt,s,r  Buyer price (CIF) 
PMt,r  Aggregate imported goods price Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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PXt,r  Composite goods price 
PDt,r  Domestic goods price 
Pt,r  Average output price 
PTCt,r  TCP Sectoral unit cost of production 
PVEt,r  Value-added energy composite price 
PVCt,r  VC Value-added composite price 
PENt,r  Energy composite price 
PNt,r  Intermediate good composite price 
PFNf,r  Factor price (net of tax) 
PFf,r  Factor price (gross of tax) 
PCt,r  Consumer purchase price 
CPIr  Consumer price index 
ERTr  Exchange rate 
VEt,r  Value-added energy composite good 
VAt,r  Value-added composite 
ENt,r  Energy composite 
VCt,r  Sectoral variable production cost 
NXt,r  Composite intermediate good 
IXt,k,r  Intermediate demand 
DFf,t,r  Sectoral factor demand 
Ct,r  Household consumption 
GCt,r  Government consumption 
IDt,r  Investment demand 
SUPYr  Household consumption above subsistence level 
SXt,r  Composite good supply 
DXt,r  Domestic sales of domestically made good Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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Xt,s,r  Trade flows 
EXt,r  Exports 
MXt,r  Sectoral imports by region 
TRQSr  International shipping supply by region 
PTR  International shipping service price 
TRQDt,r  International shipping demand by region 
TRQ  Total international transport supply 
HDIr  Household disposable income 
SAVr  Household savings 
GREVr  Government revenue 
TARIFFr  Tariff revenue 
ETAXr  Export tax revenue 
PTAXr  Output tax revenue 
CTAXr  Consumption tax revenue 
FTAXr  Factor tax revenue 
HTAXr  Household tax revenue 
NETINFLr  Net capital inflow by country 
CO2TAXFt1,r  Carbon tax per fuel 
CO2TAXr  Country carbon tax 
CO2TAXRr  Country carbon tax revenue 
CO2TOTr  Total CO2 emissions by country 
GDPRr  GDP (final demand) 
GDPVAr  GDP (value added) 
PINDEXr  GDP deflator (numeraire) 
Qt,r  Sectoral output 
FSf,r  Factor endowment by region Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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INVr  Gross investment by region 
GSAVr  Government savings 
GPURr  GSP Government purchases 
GTRANSr  Net government transfers 
 
Table B5. Elasticities of Substitution 
n σ SGN 0.15 all industries 
ve σ SVE 0.5 all industries 
v σ SGV 0.2(COA, OIL, GAS), 1.1, 1.3(PCP, ELY), 1.4 
en σ SEN 0.5 all industries 
e σ SGE –2.1, –3.5, –5.6, –7.2 
m σ SGM   1.9, 2.1, 2.3(PCP), 2.8(COA, OIL, GAS), 4.0(WAP), 5.2(MVH) 




Table B6.  Demand Elasticity for Output 
Sectors Elasticity 
Farms -0.812
Forestry, fishing etc  -0.812 
Oil mining  -0.296 
Gas mining  -0.296 
Coal mining  -0.106 
Other mining activities  -0.633 
Electric Utilities (inc govt enterprises)  -0.160 





Wood & Furniture  -0.698 
Pulp mills   -0.698 
Paper mills   -0.698 
Paperboard mills   -0.698 
Other papers  -0.698 
Refining-LPG -0.071 
Refining-Other -0.071 
Petrochemical mfg   -0.987 
Other basic inorg. chemical mfg    -0.987 
Other basic organic chemical mfg   -0.987 
Plastics material and resin mfg       -0.987 
Artificial & syn fibers, filaments                                -0.987 
Fertilizer manufacturing                                                   -0.987 
Other Chemical & Plastics  -0.987 
Glass container manufacturing                                         -0.827 
Cement manufacturing                                                     -0.827 
Lime and gypsum product mfg                                        -0.827 
Mineral wool manufacturing                                            -0.827 
Other Nonmetallic mineral  -0.827 
Iron & steel mills, ferroalloy mfg                                     -0.953 
Alumina refining, primary aluminum                              -0.953 
Ferrous metal foundries                                                    -0.953 
Nonferrous metal foundries                                              -0.953 
Other Primary metals  -0.953 
Fabricated metals  -0.505 
Machinery -1.662 
Computer & Electrical Equip  -2.596 Resources for the Future  Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih 
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Motor vehicles  -2.485 
Other transportation Equip  -2.485 
Misc manufacturing  -1.662 
Trade -0.745 
Air transportation  -0.833 
Truck transportation  -0.833 
Other transportation  -0.833 
Information -0.745 
Finance and Insurance  -0.745 
Real estate and rental  -0.745 
Business services  -0.745 
Other services  -0.745 
Govt exc. Electricity  -0.745 
 
 